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Abstract
Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but there is
limited empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of au-
thority. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in
an authority-delegation game. Individuals exhibit a tendency to retain authority even
when its delegation is in their material interest — suggesting that the authority alloca-
tion has non-pecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to a substantial
over-provision of effort by the controlling party, while a large percentage of subordi-
nates under-provide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus
has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from
suboptimal delegation choices.
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Authority and power play an important role in human societies. Influential scholars from
various social science disciplines — such as Marx (1867), Russell (1938), Parsons (1963),
Dahl (1957), and Weber (1978) — have contributed to our understanding of the origins,
characteristics, and potential consequences of these forces.
Despite some notable early exceptions (Simon (1951); Zeuthen (1968); Harsanyi (1978);
Bowles and Gintis (1988)), the study of authority and power has not been a major focus
in economics. More recently, however, organizational economists have taken interest in the
incentive effects of decision rights by studying situations where one party has the contractual
right to make decisions that influence another party’s payoffs and potential choices (Gross-
man and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990); Aghion and Tirole (1997); Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (1999); Dessein (2002); Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004)). The granting
of decision rights can mitigate inefficiencies by shielding the controlling party from potential
holdup and expropriation.
There is, however, very little empirical work in economics that examines the behavioral
consequences of authority and power or their motivational origins. This paper explores these
forces using a laboratory experiment where we study how individuals manage and respond
to authority in a hierarchical relationship. We propose a new “authority-delegation game”
based on a model developed in Aghion and Tirole (1997). A principal and an agent must
select one of a large number of potential projects for implementation. One party, initially
the principal, has the right to decide which project to implement. The other party, initially
the agent, can only make a project recommendation but lacks direct power to determine the
project. We follow Aghion and Tirole (1997) by defining authority as the right to determine
the project.
Payoffs to the principal and agent for implementing a project are unknown ex ante, and
both parties can provide effort which directly controls the probability with which they will
be informed about the value of each project. One of the projects is best for the principal,
while a different project is best for the agent. After the parties have exerted effort, four
states are possible: both parties are informed, only the principal is informed, only the agent
is informed, or neither party is informed. Before the parties provide effort, the principal can
delegate authority to the agent and become the subordinate party. Delegation of authority
means that the agent becomes the controlling party and has the right to choose the project.
Both the controlling party (i.e. the party with the decision right) and the subordinate
party have pecuniary incentives to exert effort in this setup because both parties earn only
a low outside option in the absence of any information. The subordinate’s incentives are
lower, however, because if both parties are informed, the controlling party may overrule
the subordinate’s proposal and choose the project which is best for him or her. Delegation
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therefore increases the agent’s effort because he can now implement his preferred project in
cases where he is informed. However, delegation also reduces the principal’s control over
project choice. When the principal’s return from the agent’s preferred project is high, the
cost of losing authority is small. A rational principal who maximizes her expected payoff
should thus delegate authority in this case. When a principal’s return from the agent’s
preferred project is low, however, the cost of losing authority is high and a rational principal
who maximizes expected payoff should retain authority.
Our first main result is that the principals show a proclivity for retaining authority
in situations in which they could improve their expected income by delegating it, i.e. in
situations in which their return from the agent’s preferred project is relatively high. However,
the principals only delegate in roughly 40 percent of these cases. Pessimistic expectations
about the agent’s effort in case of delegation cannot explain this reluctance. On the contrary,
the principals have quite reasonable beliefs about the agent’s effort, meaning that it would
be profitable to delegate in the clear majority of cases based on these beliefs. Nevertheless,
principals prefer retaining authority.
These findings suggest that the principals might view authority not just as an instrument
that helps them increase their earnings, but that the allocation of decision rights has non-
pecuniary consequences that inhibit the delegation of authority.1 In our experiment, the fact
that the principals are willing to sacrifice some of their earnings to keep authority suggests
a preference for the decision right.
Why are the principals willing to forgo money in order to keep the decision right? Our
empirical data indicate that a disutility for being overruled appears to be an important driver
behind their reluctance to delegate. A principal is overruled if (i) she delegates authority
and (ii) both the principal and the agent are informed about project values so that (iii) the
agent can disregard the principal’s information and choose his preferred project. Note that
the principal’s pecuniary payoff from the agent’s preferred project is the same regardless of
whether the principal is informed about the project values or not. Conditional on effort, an
expected utility maximizing principal who is the subordinate of an informed agent should
thus be indifferent between the case where she is informed and overruled by the agent and
the case where she remains uninformed. It follows that her behavior after being informed,
overruled, and receiving the payoff from the agent’s preferred project should be identical to
her behavior after being uninformed and receiving the same payoff.
If, however, a principal experiences a non-pecuniary disutility from being overruled, her
1Psychologists have postulated a preference for power (Mulder (1975)) or a preference for agency, auton-
omy and self determination (Rotter (1966); deCharms (1968); Deci (1981)). To our knowledge, however, no
evidence yet exists that demonstrates a willingness to pay (i.e. a preference) for power, agency, or autonomy.
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behavior after these two outcomes may differ: the principal may be less willing to delegate
in the next period if overruled. This is exactly what we find in our data. Principals who
are overruled are significantly less likely to delegate in the next period relative to those who
are uninformed, even if it is in their pecuniary interest to delegate. Moreover, we observe
significantly higher delegation rates in a control treatment where delegation is profitable and
the principal cannot be overruled after delegation (because she always remains uninformed)
relative to a treatment in which the profitability of delegation is larger but the principal
can be overruled. Thus, a disutility from being overruled appears to be an important non-
pecuniary factor behind the reluctance to delegate.
Our second main finding is that the controlling party substantially over-provides effort
relative to the Nash equilibrium and relative to his or her best response to the subordinate
party’s anticipated effort. This over-provision is persistent, with no convergence to the
Nash Equilibrium over time. Being in the position of the controlling party thus generates
additional motivation for effort provision.
Our third main finding is that many subordinates substantially under-provide effort rel-
ative to the Nash equilibrium. In fact, a substantial minority of the subordinate parties
(between 30 and 50 percent across various treatments) chooses a zero effort level even though
— due to the very small cost of low positive effort levels — zero effort is almost never an
optimal choice. This result suggests that the lack of authority has a demotivating effect on
a substantial minority of the subordinate parties.
It turns out that many aspects of our data can be captured by the notion that subjects
want to avoid ex-post regret about their choices — a hypothesis that was introduced by
Loomes and Sugden (1982). Regret aversion is a form of reference dependent utility and is
based on the idea that subjects derive disutility from regret that arises by comparing their
actual ex-post outcomes with those the subject could have had by choosing a different action.
A distaste for ex-post regret can explain our under-delegation result in the following
manner:2 the principals exert strictly less effort throughout the experiment as a subordinate
(i.e. after delegation) than they did as the controlling party. Thus, a principal who delegates
and is informed in the role of a subordinate would also have been informed as the controlling
party.3 As being overruled leads to a project with a lower value to the principal, a principal
2For further details see online appendix A where we apply a formal model of regret aversion to our
experiment.
3Effort in the experiment is identical to the probability of becoming informed about the value of each
project. Each party’s effort is a number in the set {0, 5, ..., 100}; this effort is compared to a random number
equally distributed between 1 and 100. If the random number is below the effort of the party, the party
was informed about the value of all projects; if the random number is above the effort of the party, the
party remained uninformed. Thus, if the principal’s effort as a controlling party is higher than her effort as
a subordinate party, then being informed as a subordinate party implies that the principal also would have
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who delegates and is informed and overruled may regret her delegation choice ex post, because
if she had kept her decision right she could have chosen her preferred project. Anticipating
such regret, an individual may maintain control in order to mitigate the potential for regret.
Moreover, a principal who has delegated can minimize feelings of regret by minimizing the
probability of being informed, i.e., by choosing a zero effort. Thus, the desire to avoid
regret can explain both the propensity for under-delegation and the low effort choices of the
subordinates.4 Finally, regret may analogously generate the over-provision of effort by the
controlling parties if they experience regret when they remain uninformed because the right
to choose the project is of little value in this case. We discuss the evidence in favor of regret
aversion in more detail in section 3.2.2, section 3.5, and online appendix A.
Our paper is related to the experimental literature on the consequences of delegation on
punishment choices (Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), Coffman (2011)). While these papers
study the assignment of punishment in response to the allocation choices of either a principal
or a delegate, our paper studies the willingness of the principal to delegate and the willingness
of a principal and an agent to invest effort in response to the assignment of decision rights.
Our results on effort provision is also related to the literature on the hidden costs of control
(Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), Fehr and List (2004), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Charness,
Cobo-Reyes, Jimenez, Lacomba and Lagos (forthcoming)). While this literature shows that
the exercise of control reduces an individuals’ positive reciprocity towards the principal, our
paper shows that lack of control has demotivating consequences on subordinates that induce
them to act against their material self interest.
We believe that our results have potentially important implications across many domains.
In relation to the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore
(1990)), (re)allocating property rights across firms may be difficult if decision rights have
non-pecuniary consequences for utility because organization members with decision rights
may oppose their re-allocation, even if they would benefit economically from it. The under-
delegation of authority not only reduces the principals’ earnings, but also causes the agent
to lose money in some of our treatments. Thus the distortion in the allocation of control
rights can lead to organizational structures that reduce the value of the organization as a
whole. The identification of motivational obstacles to delegation adds an important com-
ponent to the theoretical work by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999), Sliwka (2001), and
Bester and Kra¨hmer (2008), which predicts limits to delegation in environments with limited
been informed as a controlling party.
4Note that regret can affect not only principals, but also agents in the subordinate role. The agents’ efforts
might be wasted even if they are informed, since in cases where the principal is also informed, the agent will
be overruled. In these cases, agents may regret positive effort levels ex post. Therefore, regret averse agents
in the subordinate role may reduce effort relative to an agent that maximizes his or her expected earnings.
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commitment, dynamic incentives, or limited liability.
A reluctance to delegate decision rights may also play a role in corporate finance, in the
political sphere, and in the design of optimal institutions for regulating relations between
firms. Models of empire-building investment (Jensen (1986), Hart and Moore (1995)), which
have been used extensively in the literature to understand the trade-offs between financial
instruments may, in part, be founded on non-pecuniary motives to retain authority. In
view of incumbents’ advantages for re-election (Gelman and King (1990)), these motives
also strengthen the case for term limits because politicians may otherwise try to keep their
political power positions beyond what is good for the polity. In addition, they may provide
a rationale for models in the spirit of Niskanen (1971) which assume that bureaucrats seek
to maximize their discretionary budget.
The motivational consequences of authority for effort provision may be equally important.
The motivation enhancing effect for the controlling parties and the detrimental effect on
the motivation of a large minority of the subordinates suggest that the incentive effects of
authority are larger than the standard model predicts: a reallocation of authority may cause
a marked increase in effort by the new controlling party and a large reduction in effort by the
party previously in control. The noteworthy gap between the controlling and the subordinate
parties’ efforts also implies that when contracts are incomplete, the efficiency losses due to
authority are likely to be higher than the standard model predicts. Furthermore, our finding
that a lack of authority only seems to demotivate a minority of people suggests that putting
the right people into positions that lack authority is important. The development of tools
for detecting this type of employees may thus be important in minimizing the cost associated
with the (re)allocation of authority.
Despite the systematic deviations from the predictions of the Aghion and Tirole (1997)
model, we believe that their model is very useful for the study of authority because the
main comparative static predictions of the model are nicely met and the precise numerical
predictions of the model enabled us to detect the motivational forces we described above. The
model is thus incomplete in terms of the underlying motivational forces, but the (incomplete)
model is remarkably robust in terms of the comparative static predictions. It remains to
be seen whether this robustness is a general feature of the broader organizational economics
literature where communication (Dessein (2002), Rantakari (2008)), monetary incentives
(Athey and Roberts (2001)), and dynamic learning (Aghion et al. (2004)) are possible.
However, even if the robustness of the comparative static predictions of the Aghion and
Tirole model extends to the broader organizational economics literature, we believe that this
literature should take the behavioral forces observed in our paper into account because —
as we show here — they may have important consequences.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a simplified version of
the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) in section 1 and derive its theoretical predictions.
Section 2 details our experimental design and hypotheses. Section 3 reports the main re-
sults of our experiment and is separated into three parts. Section 3.1 summarizes the data
and provides an overview of the major results. Section 3.2 explores possible reasons why
principals might choose to keep control rights. The third part, consisting of sections 3.3-3.5,
examines the reasons for the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort and why subordi-
nate parties might want to under-provide effort relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium.
Section 4 concludes.
1 Theoretical Motivations
The basis of our experimental design is a model of authority developed in Aghion and Tirole
(1997). We consider a world in which a principal (she) and an agent (he) are organized
in a hierarchical structure and must decide to implement one or zero projects out of a set
of n ≥ 3 potential projects. With each project k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is an associated non-
contractible gain of Pk for the principal and a private benefit Ak for the agent. If no project
is implemented, the profit and private value are both equal to a known outside value of P0
and A0 respectively.
For ease of exposition, we index the principal’s preferred project by 1 and the agent’s
preferred project by 2. The principal’s preferred project yields known profit P1 to the
principal and A1 to the agent where P1 > P0 and A1 > A0. Likewise, the agent’s preferred
project yields known benefit P2 to the principal and A2 to the agent with A2 > A0 and
P2 > P0. As their name suggests, the principal’s preferred project yields a strictly higher
value to the principal than the agent’s preferred project (P1 > P2). Likewise, the agent’s
preferred project yields strictly higher value to the agent than the principal’s preferred project
(A2 > A1).
While the potential values of projects are known, all projects look identical ex ante and
information must be collected in order to differentiate between them. The principal and
agent acquire information in a binary form. At private cost gA(e), the agent learns his
payoffs to all candidate projects with probability e. With probability 1− e, the agent learns
nothing and cannot differentiate between the projects. Similarly, at private cost gP (E), the
principal becomes perfectly informed about the payoffs of all projects with probability E and
learns nothing with probability 1−E. Effort choices are made simultaneously and privately.
We concentrate on the case where gA(e) and gP (E) are quadratic, g
′
A(0) = g
′
P (0) = 0,
P1 − g′P (1) < 0, and A2 − g′A(1) < 0. These assumptions ensure that the reaction functions
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are linear and that a unique interior solution exists for both authority allocations.5
We consider a four stage game which relates decision rights, incentive conflict, and effort.
In the first stage, the principal decides whether to keep decision rights or to delegate them to
the agent. In the second stage, both parties privately and simultaneously gather information
about the n projects’ payoffs. In the third stage, the subordinate recommends a project
to the controlling party. Finally, the controlling party implements a project or the outside
option on the basis of his information and the information communicated by the subordinate.
We assume that the principal and agent are risk neutral. For a given effort level and
implemented project k, the principal’s utility is Pk−gP (E). The agent’s utility is Ak−gA(e).
As outcomes and effort choices are non-contractible, performance or outcome-contingent
payments are ruled out and the introduction of wages is necessary only to satisfy the agent’s
participation constraint, which, to avoid further notation, we assume to be satisfied.
Information in the model is soft so that information passed between parties cannot be
verified. As such, if one party is informed and the other party is uninformed, the informed
party can limit the amount of information given to the other party. As there is always an
incentive conflict between the parties and outcomes are non-contractible, there is always
an incentive to restrict information to the preferred project of the informed individual. It
follows that communication between parties is reduced to a recommendation for a single
project choice.
1.1 Analysis and Theoretical Implications
We denote the party that has authority as the controlling party while the party without
authority is called the subordinate. For each party, the expected value for selecting a project
at random is less than their respective outside option. Thus, under the assumption of risk
neutrality or risk aversion, the subordinate prefers to recommend the outside option rather
than a random project. Similarly, an uninformed controlling party never chooses unilaterally
to undertake a project other than the outside option.
Given that A2 > A1 > A0, P1 > P2 > P0, and information is soft, the subordinate
always has an incentive to recommend his or her preferred project to the controlling party.
The controlling party has an incentive to follow this recommendation if uninformed and to
overrule the project and implement his or her preferred project if informed. It follows that
5In the experiment, we also use a discrete effort space to reduce cognitive burden. All predictions in
section 2.2 are relative to the restricted effort space.
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if the principal keeps control, the utilities of a risk-neutral principal and agent are
EVP = EPˆ1 + (1− E)ePˆ2 + P0 − gP (E), (1)
EVA = EAˆ1 + (1− E)eAˆ2 + A0 − gA(e), (2)
where
Pˆi = Pi − P0, for i ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
Aˆi = Ai − A0, for i ∈ {1, 2}. (4)
If the agent receives control, the utility of the principal and agent are
EV dP = (1− e)EPˆ1 + ePˆ2 + P0 − gP (E), (5)
EV dA = (1− e)EAˆ1 + eAˆ2 + A0 − gA(e), (6)
where the superscript d denotes the expected payoffs in the delegation case.
From Equations 1 and 2, the reaction functions if the principal keeps control are the
solutions to the following first order conditions:
Pˆ1 − ePˆ2 = g′P (E), (7)
(1− E)Aˆ2 = g′A(e). (8)
Equation 7 describes the principal’s reaction function which we denote by rP (e). Equation
8 describes the agent’s reaction function denoted by rA(E). Note that both rP (e) and rA(E)
are downward sloping in (E, e)-space, implying that the principal’s and agent’s effort level are
strategic substitutes. Thus, an increase in the agent’s effort induces the principal to reduce
her effort and vice versa. By the additional assumptions placed on gP (E) and gA(e) above,
the reaction functions are also linear and there exists an interior intersection of reaction
functions, (eNE, ENE), which constitutes the Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
If the agent receives control, the reaction curves of the principal and agent are the solu-
tions to:
(1− e)Pˆ1 = g′P (E), (9)
Aˆ2 − EAˆ1 = g′A(e), (10)
and denoted by rdP (e
d) and rdA(E
d). As in the case when the principal keeps control, the reac-
tion functions are downward sloping in (Ed, ed) space. Our uniqueness criteria assumed above
8
again ensure the existence of an interior intersection of reaction functions, (ed
NE
, Ed
NE
),
which constitutes the Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
A careful examination of the reaction functions if the principal keeps control and if the
agent receives control reveals that the principal decreases her effort when giving up control
while the agent increases his effort. Delegation thus has two effects on the principal’s payoff:
1) a cost saving effect since delegation reduces the equilibrium effort of the principal and
increases the agent’s equilibrium effort, and 2) a project selection effect which decreases
the probability that the principal’s preferred project is undertaken. As these effects are, in
general, of opposite sign, the overall incentive for delegation depends on the specifics of the
cost function and the degree of interest alignment. In our experiment, we chose cost functions
and parameters such that the magnitude of Pˆ2 determines whether delegation or retention is
optimal for the principal. Full details of the experimental design and its parameterizations
are discussed in more detail in the next section.
2 The Experiment
2.1 The Authority Game
At the center of our experimental design is a computerized authority-delegation game with
the following features. In each of ten periods, a principal is matched with an agent and
shown a set of 36 cards on her computer screen representing potential projects.6 One of
these cards has a small positive payoff for both players and is placed face up representing
the outside option. The remaining thirty five cards are shuﬄed face down so that the location
of each project is unknown. One of these cards is red and represents the principal’s preferred
project. Following the theory section, we refer to this card as project 1. A second card is
blue and represents the agent’s preferred project. We refer to this card as project 2. The
remaining thirty-three cards are white and result in zero payoff for both parties. The task
of each principal-agent pair is to select a card which will be used for payment. The payoffs
ensure that individuals prefer to implement the outside option relative to picking a card at
random.
Play of the game is done in six stages which are illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed here.
Initially principals are given the decision right which corresponds to being able to select a
card at the end of the game. In the first stage of the game, each principal is asked whether
he wishes to keep this right or to transfer the right to the agent. Giving the right to the
6Subjects are randomly assigned the role of a principal or of an agent and remain in this role throughout
the experiment. In the instructions, they were referred to as participant A and participant B.
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agent is binding and irreversible.
In the second stage, subjects choose their effort levels simultaneously and in private.7
Both subjects select their effort in increments of 5 from {0, 5, . . . , 95, 100}. This effort cor-
responds to the probability that the subject learns the location of all projects. Effort has an
associated cost generated via a quadratic cost function which is constant across treatments
and player types:
gP (E) = 25
(
E
100
)2
, gA(e) = 25
(
e
100
)2
. (11)
Subjects are presented information on the cost of effort in a table where each possible effort
and its associated cost is displayed. In all but one session, agents’ effort levels are recorded
via the strategy method where an effort level is elicited both for the case where principals
keep decision rights and the case where these rights are delegated.8 Thus, agents choose
their effort levels before they know whether the principal has delegated authority to them.
In the third stage, we elicit beliefs of both subjects. Principals and agents are asked their
beliefs about the effort of the other party both in the case where decision rights are kept and
where they are delegated. For principals this is done in two steps. Beliefs are first elicited for
the chosen authority assignment followed by beliefs for the counterfactual. For agents, beliefs
for both potential authority assignments are elicited simultaneously. To prevent hedging, no
incentives are used in the elicitation of beliefs. In the fourth stage, agents are informed about
whether principals kept or transferred decision rights. Then, given a subject’s effort for the
principal’s assignment of authority, a random process determines whether that subject learns
the payoffs of all projects or whether he stays uninformed. The effort of the other subject is
not revealed nor is information indicating the success or failure of the other subject’s effort.
All information gained at this stage is private.
In the fifth stage, the subordinate is given the ability to recommend a project to the
controlling party. This is accomplished by visibly marking a single project on the computer
screen, which can include the outside option. The recommendation is shown to the control-
ling party, but the payoffs associated with the recommended project are kept hidden in the
case where the controlling party remains uninformed.
In the final stage, after seeing the recommendation of the subordinate and the information
7In the experiment we refer to effort as “search intensity”.
8We test whether the strategy method influences our results by comparing the results of three sessions
of the HIGH treatment where the strategy method was run (N = 70) to the session of the HIGH treatment
where a standard elicitation method was used (N = 30). We find no difference across treatments. P-Values
of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which tests whether the distribution of agent effort is identical in treatments
with and without strategy method, are 0.79 for effort with decision rights and 0.81 for effort without decision
rights. Delegation frequencies differ by 1.6 percent. This difference is also not significant (p=0.71 in a Fisher’s
exact test). The data from the treatments using the strategy method are therefore pooled with the data
from treatments using the standard elicitation method in the subsequent analysis.
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from his own effort, the controlling party selects a project. Payment for the round is based
on the selected project and the costs of effort of each subject.
St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 Stage 6age age age age age  
Delegation
i i
Effort 
i i
Beliefs
(S )
Project Valuations
Determined/Not
Principal
Dec s on Dec s on trategy Determined
Signal of
Formal
Choice of 
Agent
Effort 
D i i Beliefs
Delegation
Revealed
Subordinate Controlling
Party
ec s on
(Strategy) (Strategy) Project Valuations
Determined/Not
Determined
Figure 1: Experimental procedures in the authority game
2.2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design involves four treatments implemented in a between-subjects design.
Treatments vary in the amount that principals and agents are paid for the selection of the
project preferred by the other party (P2 and A1). By changing the payoff given to the other
party, the level of incentive conflict in the environment is changed, which, as indicated by
the first order conditions in section 1.1, leads to differences in predicted delegation and effort
levels.
Table 1 summarizes the value of projects across the four treatments. In each treatment,
each party earns 40 points for the selection of their preferred project and a smaller amount for
the other party’s preferred project. Treatments are divided into two groups — symmetric and
asymmetric — where symmetry refers to the relative values of P2 and A1. In the symmetric
treatments (LOW and HIGH) the payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are the
same for the principal and agent. In the low alignment treatment (LOW), the payoffs from
the other party’s preferred project are small (20) leading to a high degree of incentive conflict.
In the high alignment treatment (HIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred project
are large (35) leading to less incentive conflict. In the asymmetric treatments (PLOW and
PHIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are large for one of the two
parties (35) and small for the other (20). As a naming convention, we use PHIGH to denote
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the case where the principal’s value is high under the agent’s preferred project. The PLOW
treatment is the case where the principal’s value is low under the agent’s preferred project.
Table 1: Overview of Project Payoffs
Project 1 Project 2 Outside Other
Principal Agent Principal Agent Option Projects
PLOW 40 35 20 40 10 0
LOW 40 20 20 40 10 0
HIGH 40 35 35 40 10 0
PHIGH 40 20 35 40 10 0
Table 2 shows the predicted Nash equilibrium effort levels and expected profits for each
treatment under the case where authority is kept and transferred. As in the model developed
in Section 1, E represents the effort level of the principal while e represents the effort level
of the agent. As can be seen in table 2, the LOW treatment has a high degree of incentive
conflict and authority should be kept by the principal, because the principals expected profit
if she keeps control, EVP , is 20.1 while the expected payoff if she delegates control, EV
d
P ,
is only 17.3. In the HIGH treatment, incentive conflict is reduced and the principal should
delegate authority (EVP = 23.3 vs. EV
d
P = 24.0)
9.
Table 2: Predicted effort levels and expected profits
Principal has control Agent has control Predicted
ENE eNE EVP EVA E
dNE ed
NE
EV dP EV
d
A Delegation
PLOW 55 25 20.1 25.6 35 45 17.2 23.3 No
LOW 55 25 20.1 17.3 25 55 17.3 20.1 No
HIGH 45 35 23.3 24.0 35 45 24.0 23.3 Yes
PHIGH 45 35 23.3 17.2 25 55 25.6 20.1 Yes
ENE and Ed
NE
denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the principal depending on the control allocation.
eNE and ed
NE
denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the agent depending on the control allocation.
EVP , and EV
d
P denote expected equilibrium profits for the principal depending on the control allocation.
EVA and EV
d
A denote expected equilibrium profits for the agent depending on the control allocation.
In the asymmetric treatments the rewards to delegation are either exacerbated or fur-
ther diminished relative to the symmetric treatments. Of the four treatments, principals
are predicted to have the highest expected value from delegation in the PHIGH treat-
ment (EV dP = 25.6) and the lowest expected value from delegation in the PLOW treatment
(EV dP = 17.2).
9As will be shown below, while the difference in theoretical expected value is small, the empirical difference
turns out to be large.
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In addition to the delegation predictions, the different interest alignments also lead to
different predictions with regard to equilibrium effort levels. All point predictions are given
in Table 2. Note that the delegation decisions predicted by the Nash equilibrium are always
in the set of welfare maximizing delegation choices. In the PLOW treatment, aggregate
expected earnings EVp+EVA are highest if the principal keeps authority, while in the PHIGH
treatment aggregate expected earnings are highest if the principal delegates authority. In
the symmetric treatments, LOW and HIGH, the delegation decision has no effect on the
overall welfare if subjects choose Nash equilibrium effort levels.
In the experiment described above, the delegation decision of the principal and the joint
effort decisions of the principal and agent generate one of many potential compound lotteries.
If an individual’s preferences are reference dependent (as, e.g., stipulated in regret theory),
the individual’s preferred action profile may depart from the equilibrium action profile which
assumes players are expected value maximizers. In order to control for such heterogeneity in
preferences, we ran a lottery task and used choices from this lottery task as a proxy for the
degree to which a subject’s preferences exhibit reference dependence. In the lottery task,
each subject is presented with the opportunity to participate in six different lotteries, each
having the following form:
Win CHF 6 with probability 1
2
, lose CHF X with probability 1
2
. If subjects reject
the lottery they receive CHF 0.
The six lotteries varied in the amount X, that could be lost, where X took on the values
X ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. One of the six gambles was randomly selected and paid. As these
lotteries are binary, any reference dependent utility function with a reference point between
the lowest and the highest outcome can lead to a rejection of gambles with X ≤ 6. In
particular, individuals who are regret averse and compare their outcome to the action which
is optimal ex post will reject actuarially fair gambles. Thus, the amount X at which a
subject starts rejecting the lottery can therefore be taken as an indicator of the degree to
which a subject’s preference exhibits reference dependence, such as, e.g., regret aversion. For
example, a subject that rejects all lotteries with a potential loss of X > 3 is classified as
exhibiting more regret aversion than a subject that only rejects all lotteries with a potential
loss of X > 5.10
In principle, the rejection of actuarially fair gambles in the lottery choice task may also
reflect a subject’s loss or risk aversion. However, in Section 3.5 and the online appendices D
10143 out of 150 subjects who participated in the lottery task and played the authority-delegation game
in one of our main treatments have a unique switching point. We use the accepted gamble with the largest
potential loss as the independent variable when using the lottery task and do not exclude subjects in the
analysis. Excluding subjects with multiple switching points does not significantly alter any of our results.
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and E we show that loss and risk aversion have little explanatory power with regard to effort
choices while regret aversion can rationalize both the controlling parties’ over-provision of
effort and the preference for extremely low (i.e. zero) effort levels among the subordinates.11
Thus, if regret aversion is a motive behind subjects’ rejection of lotteries in the lottery
task then the propensity to reject lotteries should also be a predictor of subjects’ effort
level as a controlling party and the tendency to provide zero effort as a subordinate party.
Likewise, if regret aversion is a motive behind both the propensity to reject lotteries and
the reluctance to delegate then we should observe a correlation between the two phenomena.
The lottery task may thus provide further evidence regarding the motivational forces behind
effort and delegation choices.
2.3 Procedures
Typically, between 20 and 30 subjects participated in each experimental session which con-
sisted of three parts.12 In part one, subjects played 7 periods of a single player version of
the authority game. This single player game is identical to the authority game except that
there is no second party. Subjects choose an effort and receive information probabilistically
based on their effort. Each individual must then select a project based solely on his own
information. The selected project does not affect the payoff of a second party nor does a
second party recommend a project. This single player variant gives subjects a chance to get
familiar with the effort cost schedule and the computer program.
In part two, the subjects are divided into matching groups of 10 subjects consisting of 5
principals and 5 agents. Subjects play 10 periods of the main authority game in one of the
four treatments. Subjects are informed that in a new period they would be matched with
another randomly chosen partner.
In part three, subjects are asked to take a short questionnaire in which demographic
information is recorded. Instructions for the experiment include a control quiz and a verbal
summary of the authority game.
Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at Zurich University and the Federal
Institute of Technology in Zurich.13 The first series of experiments took place in May and
June 2007 with a second series of experiments conducted in May and October 2008. Further
11Moreover, it has been shown by Rabin (2000) that the rejection of lotteries for X ≤ 6 cannot be reconciled
with the assumption that utility is a (reference-independent) strictly concave function of total wealth. Risk
aversion based on concave utility of wealth at such low stake levels would imply unreasonable levels of risk
aversion at higher stakes, which makes risk averse behavior in this task incompatible with expected utility
theory.
12More details on individual sessions is provided in online appendix B.
13Subjects were drawn from a database of volunteers using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
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control experiments were conducted in May 2009 and April 2011.14 In total, 504 subjects
participated in the experiment, divided into 17 sessions. Experiments were computerized
using the software z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Payment was given for each period of the
main authority game, for the last five periods of the single player game, and for one randomly
chosen gamble from the lottery task. On average, an experimental session of the main
treatments lasted 1 hour with an average payment of 33.5 CHF ($35.00).15
3 Experimental Results
3.1 The Main Facts
Our experimental design generates predictions with regard to delegation, effort and project
choices. With regard to project choices and project recommendations the theory does very
well:
Result 1 Controlling parties who are informed about the project valuations almost always
choose their preferred projects, implying that they overrule the subordinates’ recommenda-
tions. Informed subordinates almost always recommend their preferred project and unin-
formed controlling parties almost always implement this recommendation.
Result 1 is supported by the following numbers. Principals (Agents) in the role of con-
trolling parties who were informed implemented their preferred project in 100 percent (97.3
percent) of the cases. Principals (agents) in the role of the informed subordinate party
recommended their preferred project in 92.6 percent (92.5 percent) of the cases. Finally,
principals (agents) in the role of the uninformed controlling party followed the subordinate
party’s recommendation in 94.1 percent (96.5 percent) of the cases. If the subordinate parties
were not informed they typically recommended the outside option (principals: 95.3 percent;
agents: 97.0 percent)
Result 1 indicates that the controlling parties used the decision right in their favor. As
predicted by theory, this generates a disincentive for subordinates’ effort provision but it also
makes it reasonable for the principals to delegate authority if their payoff loss at the agents’
preferred project is low. Therefore, we next turn to the principals’ delegation choices. Recall
that in case of Nash equilibrium effort choices by the principal and agent, the principal has
an incentive to delegate authority in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments and to keep authority
in the LOW and PLOW treatments. Empirically, we find in our experiment:
14See also online appendix B.
15The 25 and 50 period control treatments took longer. Additional information on these treatments is
given in section 3.2.
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Result 2 (a) When the principals’ interests are misaligned with the agent (LOW and PLOW)
such that the principals are predicted to keep authority, delegation decisions are close to
the equilibrium predictions. (b) When the principals’ interests are strongly aligned with the
agent (HIGH and PHIGH treatments) such that principals should delegate, we observe strong
under-delegation of authority relative to the equilibrium predictions.
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Figure 2: Delegation frequencies by alignment
Figure 2 shows the frequency of delegation for each treatment graphically. As can be
seen on the left hand side of the figure, delegation rates in the PLOW and LOW treatments
are 16.3 percent and 13.9 percent. While these levels are above the predicted level of zero,
deviations from the prediction appear to be due to infrequent experimentation rather than
heterogeneity in delegation strategies. There is little persistence in the strategy of delegation,
with 67.4 percent of individuals who delegated authority in one period switching to keeping
authority in the next. The frequency of delegation for most individuals is also low, with 39.4
percent of individuals choosing to never delegate and 89.4 percent of individuals delegating
in three periods or less.
Average delegation rates in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment are 35.5 percent and 42.7
percent, far below the predicted rate of 100 percent. These low delegation rates are also
rather stable over time. In the HIGH treatment the overall delegation rate is 33.5 percent in
the first five periods and 37.5 percent in periods 6-10. In the PHIGH treatment the overall
delegation rate is 36.7 percent in the first five periods and stabilizes around 48.7 percent
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from period 6 onwards.16
In contrast to the LOW and PLOW treatments, the under-delegation of authority in the
HIGH and PHIGH treatments appears to be due to heterogeneity in delegation strategies
across individuals. Less than 20 percent of individuals delegate seven or more times in the
experiment, and individuals who delegate in one period are more likely to delegate in the next
period suggesting some persistence in the delegation strategy. However, even in the PHIGH
treatment in which delegation incentives are highest according to the Nash prediction, 30
percent of individuals have a delegation frequency of zero suggesting that under-delegation
is rather pervasive.
One possible reason for the observed under-delegation might be that actual effort provi-
sion if the principal keeps control compared to the case in which the agent receives control
makes it more profitable to keep authority. Table 3, which shows the realized profits of prin-
cipals who kept and delegated authority, shows that this is not the case. In the HIGH and
PHIGH treatments, realized profits for the principal are lower than predicted if she keeps
control and higher than predicted if the agent receives control. Principals who delegate have
on average 30.4 percent greater earnings in the HIGH treatment and 44.5 percent greater
earnings in the PHIGH treatment.
Table 3: Realized profits and predicted equilibrium profits for principals
Principal has control Number of Agent has control Number of
Actual Predicted Observations Actual Predicted Observations
PLOW 18.4 * 20.1 251 17.6 17.2 49
LOW 19.0 20.1 310 15.0 ** 17.3 50
HIGH 19.1 *** 23.3 316 24.9 24.0 174
PHIGH 18.4 *** 23.3 172 26.6 25.6 128
Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *
p < .1.
The second main hypothesis of the experiment is about effort provision. In theory, an
incentive conflict leads the controlling party to put in more effort than would be optimal
in the case of contractible effort and causes the subordinate to put in less. Relative to this
Nash equilibrium benchmark, we observe:
16While the difference in delegation rates between the first and second half of the experiment is insignificant
for the HIGH treatment, the difference of 12 percentage points in the PHIGH treatment is significant
(p < 0.01 in a probit regression of delegation on a dummy for periods 6-10). We also ran a 50 period
session to test for potential long-run learning effects. While delegation increased over the first 20 periods,
under-delegation was still pervasive. See section 3.2.1 for details.
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Result 3 Controlling parties provide an excess of effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Subordinates under-provide effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3 plots the average deviation of effort levels from the predicted equilibrium values
by the principal and agent with both means and 95 percent confidence intervals calculated
from individual average efforts. It can be seen that, when authority is kept, the principal
over-provides and the agent under-provides relative to the prediction. This phenomenon
is reversed, again in all treatments, when authority is delegated, and these deviations are
significant for the majority of treatments.17 In the low treatment, for example, the principal
over-provides effort by roughly 10 units relative to the prediction if she keeps control while
the agent under-provides effort by about 10 units. This deviation pattern is reversed when
the agent is the controlling party.
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Figure 3: Deviations from equilibrium effort predictions. The vertical axis shows the
difference (E˜) between the principal’s observed effort (E) and the Nash Equilibrium effort
(ENE). The horizontal axis shows the difference (e˜) between the agent’s observed effort (e)
and the Nash Equilibrium effort (eNE).
17We report results from a non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test in Table C.1 of online appendix C.
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The deviations in effort levels from the equilibrium prediction cause inefficiencies that
are reflected in the low actual payoff levels of the principals and the agents relative to the
predicted payoff levels. Table 3 shows that the principals earn less than predicted in 5 out
of 8 cases. In particular, if control is kept, which occurs most frequently in all treatments,
the principals always earn less than predicted. For the agents the income loss relative to the
prediction is even more extreme (see Table 4): In all 8 cases they earn on average less than
predicted.
Table 4: Realized profits and predicted equilibrium profits for agents
Principal has control Number of Agent has control Number of
Actual Predicted Observations Actual Predicted Observations
PLOW 23.0 *** 25.6 251 18.8 ** 23.3 49
LOW 16.1 ** 17.3 310 17.9 20.1 50
HIGH 21.0 *** 24.0 316 20.1 *** 23.3 174
PHIGH 15.9 ** 17.2 172 18.1 ** 20.1 128
Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *
p < .1.
The combined effect of under-delegation and deviations in effort provision has particu-
larly strong pecuniary consequences in the PHIGH treatment. Unlike the other treatments,
delegation in this treatment leads both the principal and agent to be better off in expec-
tations relative to held control. Principals who delegate receive 45 percent more income
compared to those who hold on to decision rights. Likewise agents who are left as the sub-
ordinate receive 13.8 percent less profit than those who are delegated to. Taken together,
in PHIGH the welfare loss of keeping authority amounts to 30 percent in terms of expected
income.18 The loss in aggregate payoff due to the deviations from the Nash equilibrium are
not restricted to PHIGH, however. Table C.2 in online appendix C shows that both the
principals and the agents earn less than in the Nash equilibrium in each of the 4 treatments.
We summarize these findings in the following result:
Result 4 In each treatment, the deviation in effort provision and delegation leads to mone-
tary losses for both parties relative to the Nash equilibrium. Monetary losses are most acute
in the PHIGH treatment where delegation would lead to higher average earnings for both
parties.
18The implicit assumption in this calculation is that if the principals who kept control rights were to
delegate instead, they would exert effort similar to those who delegated. If the principal were to exert less
effort, the overall monetary loss would be slightly smaller. In the extreme case where we assume principals
exert zero effort in the counterfactual, the monetary loss would amount to 27 percent.
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3.2 Exploring the principals’ reluctance to delegate
3.2.1 Pecuniary Motivations
A natural initial hypothesis for the observed under-delegation of authority in the HIGH and
PHIGH treatments is that individuals believe that they are monetarily better off retaining
authority. To see whether this hypothesis has merit, we consider the following counterfactual:
Suppose that a principal who did not delegate would elect to delegate instead. Given her
beliefs about the agent’s actions if she keeps control and if she delegates control, what would
be her gain or loss in expected earnings?
As the effort of the principal was elicited only in the case of her chosen authority al-
location a comparison of the principal’s expected earnings for the cases of delegation and
non-delegation requires assumptions about her effort in the counterfactual authority alloca-
tion. As we have the principals’ beliefs about the agents’ effort from both the delegation case
and non-delegation case, a natural approach is to use the principal’s best reply effort as a
proxy for effort. If, for example, the principal kept authority we can compute the principal’s
best reply effort for the case in which the principal had delegated authority. Using this effort
proxy and the principal’s belief about the agent’s effort enables us to compute the principal’s
expected profit for the counterfactual case of delegation.19
As a comparison value, we next compute the expected profits of the principal for the
case of retained authority, taking the principal’s actual effort and his beliefs about the
agent’s effort into account.20 Subtracting the expected profit from retained authority from
the expected profit from delegation yields our first measure for the expected gains from
delegation.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative density function of the gains from delegating under the
assumption that the principal would have played a best reply in case he had delegated. As
can be seen in this graph by looking at the mass to the right of the zero line, 68 percent
of observations in the HIGH treatment and 92 percent of observations from the PHIGH
19Under the assumption that the principal best replies to his beliefs the expected earnings for the coun-
terfactual case of delegation is given by:
EV dP (E
d = rdP (eˆ
d), eˆd) = eˆdPˆ2 + (1− eˆd)rdP (eˆd)Pˆ1 + P0 − gP (rdP (eˆd)),
where eˆd is the principal’s belief about the agent’s effort under delegation, P0 is the principal’s payout
under the outside option, Pˆ2 is the principal’s payment under the agents preferred project net of P0, Pˆ1 is
the principal’s payment under the principal’s preferred project net of P0, and r
d
P (eˆ
d) is the best response
function constructed in Equation 9.
20This comparison value is given by
EVP (E, eˆ) = EPˆ1 + (1− E)eˆPˆ2 + P0 − gP (E).
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treatment are from individuals who would have been better off if they had delegated. The
retention of authority in the PHIGH treatment is especially noteworthy since both the prin-
cipal and the agent would be made better off through delegation. Thus, in this treatment,
the under-delegation is suboptimal not only from the principals’ perspective, but also from
the perspective of the organization as a whole.
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Figure 4: Cumulative density function of expected gain from delegation if principal best
replies to beliefs
One might worry that using the best response to beliefs as a proxy for effort might
overstate the expected return to delegation. Perhaps, some individuals may not perfectly
best respond to their beliefs.
As a conservative secondary measure for the expected gains from delegation, we next
consider the case where the principal provides zero effort after delegation. This criterion
is selected for three reasons. First, an individual who puts in zero effort has no potential
losses and minimal exposure to risk. Relative to the actual strategies typically employed by
principals, the zero effort criterion should thus be an attractive strategy for principals who
are extremely risk or loss averse. Second, besides very high effort choices which are observed
very infrequently, zero effort minimizes the expected value of delegation giving us the lowest
reasonable expected value of delegation. Finally, zero effort is in fact the modal strategy
taken after delegation suggesting it is a relevant benchmark for analysis.
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In Figure 5 we depict the cumulative density function for the expected gains from del-
egation under the assumption that the principal would have chosen zero effort if he had
delegated. We find, that 46.8 percent of observations in the HIGH treatment and 75 percent
of observations in the PHIGH treatment are from individuals who would have been better
off in case of delegation. This result is remarkable because even if we assume that principals
choose highly suboptimal effort levels after delegation, it would have often been better for
them (given their beliefs) to delegate authority.
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Figure 5: Cumulative density function of expected gain from delegation if principal chooses
zero effort after delegation
One might also be concerned that the under-delegation effect is due to having a lim-
ited number of periods in which to learn the optimal delegation strategy. Perhaps, under-
delegation is a consequence of incomplete learning in our 10 period experiments.
In order to study this hypothesis, we ran an additional treatment (PHIGH50) in which
we increased the number of periods to 50 and increased the equilibrium returns to delegation
from 10 percent (in the PHIGH treatment) to 17 percent. As with the original PHIGH treat-
ment, we use an asymmetric design in which the agent’s payment for his preferred project is
much higher than his payment under the principal’s preferred project, and where both the
principal and agent would benefit highly from delegation at the equilibrium effort levels.21
21In the PHIGH50 treatment, the payment for the principal and agent under the principal’s preferred
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To further facilitate learning we also simplified the design by making the subordinate’s rec-
ommendation automatic, i.e. the controlling party knew with certainty that an informed
subordinate would recommend his preferred project while an uninformed subordinate would
recommend the outside option.
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Figure 6: Average delegation frequencies of principals in the PHIGH50 treatment. Period
averages shown by the diamonds, quadratic time trend shown by the solid line. In total, 32
principals participated in these 50 period experiments.
Figure 6 shows the time path of delegation decisions in this treatment. As can be seen,
while there is an increase in delegation in the first 25 periods, delegation rates remain fairly
constant in the remaining 25 periods. Of the 32 principals in the treatment, 43.8 percent
never switched their delegation decision after period 25. Subjects are also on average fairly
persistent in their delegation choice. On the basis of a median split, we find that those
who predominantly keep authority delegate in only 11 percent of the cases in the second
half of this treatment. Those who predominantly delegate authority keep it in only 12.5
project were 45 and 20 respectively. Under the agent’s preferred project, the payments were 40 (for the
principal) and 45 (for the agent). Equilibrium payoffs were 31 points for the principal and 23.1 points for the
agent if the agent had control, and 26.5 points for the principal and 18.1 points for the agent if the principal
had control. We randomly paid 20 of the 50 periods at the end of the experiment. 64 subjects participated
in two sessions of this treatment, and the average session time of this experiment was 2.5 hours with an
average payment of 72 CHF ($75).
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percent of the cases in the second half of this treatment. Overall, the delegation rate is
8 percent higher in the second half of this treatment compared to the second half of the
PHIGH treatment, but this is what one would expect because of the increased incentives to
delegate in the PHIGH50 treatment. The overall delegation rates in PHIGH50 are, however,
still well below the level predicted by theory, with an average delegation rate of 56.5 percent
in the last 25 periods of the experiment. As in the PHIGH treatment, this large amount
of under-delegation occurred despite the fact that both the principals and the agents were
substantially better off in cases where decision rights were delegated relative to cases where
decision rights were held.
3.2.2 Non-pecuniary motivations
The results above suggest that many principals had strong pecuniary incentives to dele-
gate. They further suggest that a large portion of under-delegation is not due to incomplete
learning. Why then do we observe this strong reluctance to delegate?
One non-pecuniary force behind the principals’ choices appears to be a disutility from
being overruled. Recall that the principal’s return from the agent’s preferred project is the
same regardless of whether the principal is informed or uninformed. Thus, for a principal
who has delegated and faces an agent who selects his preferred project, the pecuniary value
of being informed and uninformed is the same. Conditional on effort, an expected utility
maximizing principal in the subordinate position should be indifferent between the case
where she is informed and overruled by the agent and where she remains uninformed. Thus,
her response to being overruled and receiving the payoff from the agent’s preferred project
should be identical to her response to being uninformed and receiving the payoff of the agent’s
preferred project. However, if a principal experiences a non-pecuniary disutility from being
overruled, her response to these two outcomes may differ: In the next period, the principal
may correctly anticipate the potential disutility from being overruled and, therefore, she may
be less willing to delegate.
To examine spillovers across periods, we take the principals who delegate in period t− 1
and regress the probability of delegating in period t on the information the principal and
agent received in the previous period. To account for potential differences in effort and
beliefs, we also condition on the effort of the principal in the previous period and the beliefs
the principal has about the agent’s action in the current period.
Table 5 reports the marginal effects of this regression for various subsets of our data. The
omitted category in all regressions is the case in which both the principal and the agent are
uninformed. As can be seen in column (1), the principal is more likely to delegate in period
t if either she was informed in t− 1 or the agent was informed in t− 1. However, when both
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the principal and agent were informed in t− 1 and the principal was overruled by the agent,
her delegation probability falls to the same level that also prevails if both were uninformed
in the previous period, i.e. when the outside option was implemented. This suggests that
the principal reacts negatively to being overruled — a behavior that cannot be explained if
the principal maximizes the expected utility from her monetary payoffs only. The behavioral
response to overruling is robust to specifications which include period dummies and belief
data (column (2)), and specifications which use only the HIGH and PHIGH treatments where
delegation is expected to take place (column (3)).
The importance of the overruling effect is also corroborated by data from questions in
the ex-post survey administered after the PHIGH50 treatments in April 2011. We asked
participants in the role of the principal to evaluate two delegation scenarios in both of which
they delegated and the agent’s project is implemented, and which differ only in whether
they were informed or not. On a 7-point likert scale, the scenario in which the principal
was uninformed had an average evaluation of 5.97 while the scenario in which the principal
was informed and thus overruled had a lower average evaluation of 4.59. This difference is
highly significant both in a paired t-test (p < 0.01) and in a non-parametric sign-rank test
(p < 0.01).22 Hence, even though the monetary outcome is identical across both scenarios,
principals on average assigned significantly lower value to the scenario in which they were
overruled.
We performed another test of the hypothesis that the non-pecuniary disutility of being
overruled causes a reluctance to delegate by conducting two additional 25-period treatments
which had nearly identical equilibrium returns to delegation but varied in the extent to which
overruling was possible. The first of these treatments restricted the subordinate’s effort to
zero and did not allow them to make recommendations. This treatment was symmetric with
a payment of 40 if the own preferred project was chosen and 30 if the other party’s preferred
project was chosen. We refer to this treatment as HIGH NOREC. There are relatively high
(15.8 percent) equilibrium returns to delegation since the commitment not to exert effort as
the subordinate increases the effort exerted by the controlling party. We compare this data
to a 25 period version of the PHIGH50 treatment (PHIGH25) which had similar equilibrium
returns to delegation.23
Recall that the difference between the HIGH NOREC and the PHIGH25 treatment is that
in the former the principals cannot be overruled. Therefore, if the principals derive disutility
from being overruled they should be more willing to delegate in HIGH NOREC. We find
22The two survey questions were randomly ordered and asked on separate screens of the exit survey.
23The 25 period experiments lasted on average 1.75 hours, 32 subjects participated in the PHIGH25 treat-
ment and 28 subjects participated in the HIGH NOREC treatment. Pooling earnings across the treatments,
subjects earned 44 CHF ($47) on average.
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Table 5: Delegation conditional on previous experience
(1) (2) (3)
principal informed in t− 1 0.170 0.194* 0.191
(0.120) (0.110) (0.129)
agent informed in t− 1 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.122**
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
overruled in t− 1 –0.371** –0.410*** –0.323**
(0.153) (0.149) (0.159)
effort in t− 1 –0.004** –0.005 –0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Treatment Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Belief & Time Controls? No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.249 0.199
Observations 360 360 271
Marginal Effects from a probit regression are reported in the table. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Sample is restricted to principals
who delegated in t − 1. Neither principal nor agent informed is the omitted category. Regressions (1) and
(2) contain the data from all treatments. Regression (3) contains only data from the HIGH and PHIGH
treatments, where delegation is predicted. Belief controls are beliefs of principals under both authority
allocations. Time controls are period fixed effects.
indeed that the average delegation rate of the HIGH NOREC treatment was higher (67.1
percent) than in the PHIGH25 treatment (41.3 percent) - a difference that is statistically
significant (p = 0.011).24 The higher delegation rate in HIGH NOREC occurred despite the
fact that the empirical return on delegation is 21 percentage points higher in the PHIGH25
treatment than in HIGH NOREC. For this reason, the higher delegation rates in HIGH
NOREC provide additional support for the hypothesis that being overruled is associated
with disutility.
What is the source of this disutility? A plausible answer to this question is provided by the
notion of regret aversion (which we formalize in online appendix A). To examine the role of
regret aversion in our setting it is useful to recall that the principals chose considerably higher
effort in the role of the controlling party compared to when they were the subordinate party.
Therefore, if the principals in the subordinate role became informed about which project
was best for them they knew that they would also have been informed if they had kept the
decision right. In other words, they could have chosen their best project if they had kept
their decision right. It is thus quite plausible that the principals regretted their delegation
24This p-value is calculated using a probit regression controlling for period fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by the individual.
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decision when they were informed and the agent’s preferred project was implemented. If
this regret is psychologically aversive the delegation option becomes less valuable. This
account of under-delegation in terms of regret aversion can explain the following four facts:
(i) the under-delegation of authority in the HIGH and the PHIGH treatment (ii) the sharp
reduction in delegation rates after being overruled; (iii) the subjects’ preference (in the
post-experimental survey) for being not informed about their best project when the agent’s
preferred project is implemented anyway; and (iv) the much higher delegation rate when
the experimental design rules out ex-post regret by preventing the principal from providing
effort after delegation.
Our explanation of under-delegation in terms of regret aversion would receive further
support if an individual measure of regret aversion would predict individual differences in
the reluctance to delegate. Subjects’ behavior in the lottery task described in Section 2.2
may be interpreted as such an individual difference measure. If the subjects’ reluctance
to accept the lotteries is at least partly driven by subjects’ regret aversion, the propensity
to reject lotteries should also predict the reluctance to delegate (in the treatments were
overruling can occur). This is in fact what we observe. In online appendix C (Table C3) we
report probit regressions of principals’ delegation choices with treatment conditions, period
fixed effects, principals’ beliefs about agents’ effort and the number of rejected lotteries
as explanatory variables. Individuals in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments are 12 percent
less likely to delegate for each gamble in the lottery task that they decline (p = .021). If
we combine the observations in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment, and split the sample at
median lottery acceptance, the difference in delegation frequency between the group which
accepts more gambles and the group which accepts fewer gambles is 20 percent. These
findings further support the view that regret aversion appears to be an important motive
behind the reluctance to delegate authority. The next subsections will show that the same
motive may also partly explain the controlling and the subordinate parties’ effort choices.
3.3 Exploring the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort
We saw in Figure 3 that the provision of effort by the controlling party exceeds the Nash
equilibrium prediction across all treatments while the effort of the subordinate is below
the Nash prediction. These deviations are persistent, with no convergence to the Nash
equilibrium over time.25
Persistent deviations from the Nash equilibrium might be due to one of two sources.
25Looking at agents’ effort in the first 5 periods and the last 5 periods of the four main treatments, average
effort declines by 2.4 points as a subordinate (p = 0.014 if effort is regressed on a dummy for periods 6-10)
and decreases by .2 points as controlling party (p = 0.76).
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First, for a given belief about the other party’s effort, an individual may respond to those
beliefs differently than the best reply. For example, if the controlling party systematically
over-provides effort relative to the best reply, his or her effort is likely to be higher than the
Nash equilibrium effort. Likewise, if the subordinate party under-provides effort relative to
the best reply, then the effort is likely to be lower than the Nash equilibrium effort.
Second, beliefs about the other party’s effort provision may deviate from those predicted
in the Nash equilibrium. Because of strategic substitutability, a controlling party whose
beliefs about subordinate effort are below those predicted by the Nash equilibrium will
increase his or her effort relative to the Nash equilibrium. Likewise a subordinate party
whose beliefs are above the Nash equilibrium will decrease effort in substitution. In this
subsection we examine both the best reply channel and the belief channel as potential sources
of the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort.
We first look at systematic deviations from the best response function by constructing
the theoretical best response for the controlling party if control is kept and if control is
delegated under the assumption of risk neutrality:
rP (eˆ) =
100Pˆ1 − eˆPˆ2
50
, rdA(Eˆ
d) =
100Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1
50
. (12)
By comparing these best responses with the actual response of controlling parties to their
beliefs, we can examine systematic deviations from the best response function.
Figure 7 shows this comparison pooled for all treatments. The dashed 45◦ line represents
those cases where the actual response to beliefs coincides with the best response to these
beliefs. Points above the 45◦ line represent observations in which the controlling party
over-provides relative to the best response while points below the 45◦ line represent an
under-provision of effort.
The solid line in Figure 7 shows the empirical relationship between the actual response
to beliefs about the subordinates’ effort and the best response. The positive slope of this
line indicates that the best response has some (qualitative) predictive power. However, the
overwhelming feature in the data is the systematic over-provision of effort by the controlling
party relative to the best response. Counting all observations strictly above the 45◦ line, 66
percent of observations for principals and 77 percent of observations for agents provide more
effort than is predicted by a best response to beliefs. The magnitude of this over-provision
is typically large, with 48 percent of observations 15 points or more above prediction.
While Figure 7 shows the combined data across all treatments, the pattern doesn’t vary
qualitatively across treatments. Table 6 shows the average effort of the controlling party and
the corresponding average of the best response to beliefs. As can be seen, effort provision of
28
Controlling Party
E
Principal	as	Controlling	Party Agent	as	Controlling	Party
de66%	of	observations	
ˆabove	 ሺ ሻPr e
77%	of	observations	
ˆabove	 ሺ ሻd dAr E
s e
 t o
 b
e l
i e
f s
t o
 b
e l
i e
f s
P di t dP di t d
a c
t u
a l
 r e
s p
o n
s
c t
u a
l  r
e s
p o
n s
e  re c e
Observations:
Fitted
re c e
Observations:
Fitted
P r
i n
c i
p a
l ’ s
 a
A
g e
n t
’ s
 a
c
ˆሺ ሻPr e
ˆሺ ሻd dAr E
Best Response to BeliefsBest Response to Beliefs       
Figure 7: Controlling party: Actual effort vs. best response to beliefs (Combined data from
all main treatments)
the controlling party is above the average best response prediction in all treatments and for
both authority allocations, and in 7 of these 8 cases the difference is significant.26
Based on this data, we conclude:
Result 5 Controlling parties over-provide effort relative to their best response to beliefs
about the subordinate’s effort.
Result 5 suggests that having authority appears to have a motivational effect on the
effort provision of the controlling parties. We next turn to beliefs. Since the effort of the
two parties are strategic substitutes, deviations from the Nash Equilibrium prediction may
partially be explained by pessimistic beliefs of controlling parties.
Table 7 compares actual beliefs to the Nash Equilibrium beliefs for all treatments and
both authority allocations. As can be seen by comparing the first two columns, the principal’s
belief about agent effort if control is kept is comparable to the Nash Equilibrium prediction.
26Technically, the effort provisions of individuals within a matching group may be correlated due to shared
histories. However, as the information concerning the actions of others in the matching group is limited, we
expect the effect of heterogeneous learning to be limited. As an additional control, we ran matching group-
clustered versions of each sign-rank and rank-sum test included in this paper to check whether matching
group-level effects are driving our results. As expected, the p-values of these tests are slightly higher but
have a minor effect on the significance levels reported throughout the paper. See Datta and Satten (2008)
and Datta and Satten (2005) for details of the two tests.
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Table 6: Comparison of effort provision of the controlling party to the best response to beliefs
Principal has control Agent has control
actual best response actual best response
effort effort effort effort
PLOW 55.7 53.9 68.1 *** 49.1
LOW 66.1 *** 54.5 68.3 *** 55.8
HIGH 48.2 *** 42.1 58.7 *** 45.3
PHIGH 58.2 ** 45.9 65.1 ** 56.2
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
In fact, in three out of four cases (i.e. in PLOW, LOW and HIGH) the principals’ effort
expectation is above eNE, but the deviation is not significant. Thus, pessimistic beliefs of
the principal cannot contribute to the over-provision of effort in these cases. The situation
is somewhat different if authority was delegated. Here, the controlling party (the agents)
expected in all four treatments that the subordinate party will under-provide effort relative
to the Nash equilibrium. Thus, beliefs of the agents do account for some of the over-provision
of effort relative to the Nash Equilibrium prediction.27
Table 7: Comparison of actual beliefs of the controlling party to the Nash equilibrium beliefs
Principal has control Agent has control
Nash prediction actual belief Nash prediction actual belief
PLOW 25 30.4 35 *** 21.8
LOW 25 27.5 25 * 20.9
HIGH 35 35.8 35 * 29.4
PHIGH 35 * 28.2 25 ** 19.0
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
3.4 Exploring the subordinate parties’ under-provision of effort
We next examine possible reasons for deviations from the Nash equilibrium on the part of
the subordinates. We will again examine the role of beliefs as well as the role of systematic
deviations from the best response function as potential sources of the observed deviation of
effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
27Table C.4 in online appendix C shows that beliefs of controlling parties about subordinate effort do, on
average, exceed actual subordinate effort.
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Figure 8 shows the relationship between the theoretical best response and the actual
response function for the subordinates. As before, the 45◦ line represents the predicted best
response function of the subordinate in response to beliefs about the effort of the controlling
party while the solid line shows the empirical best response behavior from a simple linear
regression. Points above the 45◦ line represent observations in which the subordinate over-
provides effort relative to the best response while points below the 45◦ line represent an
under-provision of effort.
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Figure 8: Subordinates: actual effort vs. best response to beliefs (Combined data from all
main treatments)
As can be seen in the left hand panel of the figure, the actual response function is posi-
tively sloped but relatively flat, suggesting a relatively weak effort response to beliefs. Unlike
the controlling parties’ efforts, which were clustered above the best response correspondence,
effort provisions by subordinates are heterogeneous: 52 percent of individual choices are be-
low the best response to beliefs for agents, while 56 percent of individual choices are below
the best response to beliefs for principals. In addition, a large number of individual choices
are considerably below the best response.
A particularly salient fact in Figure 8 is that a large number of subordinates put in zero
effort, i.e., lack of control appears to have a strong demotivational effect for a large minority.
Recall that the cost of effort is convex with the cost of increasing effort from 0 to 5 equalling
gP (5)−gP (0) = .06 points. Since incremental effort is nearly costless, zero effort is predicted
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only in cases where the subordinate believes in an effort of 100 by the controlling party,
which almost never occurred.
The heterogeneous behavior of subordinates also appears to be a robust phenomenon at
the treatment level. As shown in Table 8, which reports the average effort of the subordinate,
the average theoretical best response to beliefs, and the proportion of individuals who provide
zero effort for each treatment and for principals and agents separately. As can be seen by
comparing the first two columns of each treatment, there is little difference between the
actual effort and the theoretical best response to beliefs at the mean. The similarity in these
two averages reflects the heterogeneous nature of subordinate effort provision where both
under and over-provision of effort is observed.
Looking at the third column of each row, it is apparent that zero-effort is a modal strategy
for the subordinates in all treatments. Zero effort is observed 25 percent of the time in all
eight cases and in three of these cases, zero effort accounts for for roughly 50 percent of the
observations.28 The high frequency of observed zeroes is due in large part to a subset of
individuals who always exert zero effort in the subordinate role.29
Based on these observations, we conclude:
Result 6 The subordinates effort behavior is heterogeneous. While on average effort pro-
vision is close to the theoretical best response, there is a large group of subordinates who
provide zero effort, far below the optimal best response. For this group, authority appears
to have a strong demotivational effect. In addition, there is a smaller group of subordinates
who systematically over-provide effort.
Turning to beliefs, Table 9 shows the beliefs of the subordinate compared to the Nash
Equilibrium. As can be seen, agents and principals have optimistic beliefs relative to the Nash
equilibrium. As optimistic beliefs are expected to lead to a decrease in effort, beliefs may be
contributing to the under-provision of effort by the agent and the principals. However, as
we noted in Figure 8, the actual response function is much flatter than would be predicted
28One possible explanation for zero effort is that individuals who exert zero effort simply don’t understand
the environment. In studying the effort that agents exert as the controlling party, however, this explanation is
unlikely. Remember that we collect effort choices of agents in both roles, the subordinate and the controlling
party. We can therefore directly compare whether those subjects who exert zero effort as subordinates are
different from those who do not when in the controlling party role. A regression of controlling party effort
on a dummy that takes on the value 1 if subordinate effort is zero, controlling for treatment and clustering
standard errors at the individual level, reveals that those agents who chose zero effort as subordinates on
average exert 3 units of additional effort (this difference is not significant (p=0.35)). In fact, as will be
discussed later in section 3.5, a positive difference is to be expected if regret aversion directly affects effort
choices. This suggests that a lack of understanding is not the driver of zero effort choices.
29Between 18 and 33 percent of agents exert zero effort in nine or ten periods. Between 8 and 50 percent
of principals who delegated at least once exerted zero effort after each delegation.
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Table 8: Comparison of effort of subordinates to their best response to beliefs
Agents in subordinate role Principals in subordinate role
actual best response percent actual best response percent
effort to beliefs zero effort to beliefs zero
PLOW 22.8 21.1 39.0 16.5 24.2 36.7
LOW 14.3 ** 19.8 49.4 16.2 18.9 54.0
HIGH 26.5 24.5 28.5 19.6 26.3 36.8
PHIGH 17.3 18.4 50.3 20.7 22.6 36.7
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
by the best response. Whereas theory would predict that effort increases by 6 points when
beliefs fall by 10 points, the actual response to beliefs is significantly smaller. For agents,
a 10 point reduction in beliefs about the controlling parties’ effort only leads to a 1.6 point
increase in effort.30
Table 9: Comparison of actual beliefs of subordinates to the Nash equilibrium beliefs
Agents in subordinate role Principals in subordinate role
Nash prediction actual belief Nash prediction actual belief
PLOW 55 *** 64.8 45 *** 59.6
LOW 55 *** 66.9 55 *** 68.4
HIGH 45 *** 59.0 45 *** 56.2
PHIGH 45 ** 69.3 55 *** 62.3
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
3.5 The motivational and demotivational forces of authority: non-
pecuniary explanations
Thus far we have seen that for both the controlling party and the subordinate, deviations
from best response behavior account for much of the observed departure from the Nash
predictions. A significant proportion of controlling parties provide effort which exceeds the
best response function leading to effort levels higher than predicted. Similarly, a significant
proportion of subordinates provide zero effort despite the almost negligible cost of providing
30For principals, effort increases by 3.8 points when beliefs fall by 10 points. Both coefficients are signifi-
cantly smaller than the theoretically expected 6 point increase (p < 0.01) in a simple regression of effort on
beliefs. Table C.4 in online appendix C reports beliefs about controlling party effort in comparison to actual
controlling party effort choices.
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incremental effort. Having established these observational facts, the question remains which
behavioral force shows promise in rationalizing our data.
As we saw in the delegation section, many aspects of our data support the interpretation
that regret aversion is an important force behind the under-delegation of authority. Might
the same behavioral force also have promise to rationalize the observed deviations in effort
choices?
To begin our analysis, we take the same overruling effect which was found to be of
importance in delegation and ask to what extent it can explain the effort patterns of a sub-
ordinate. Recall that as a subordinate there is the potential of being overruled. If such
overruling generates non-pecuniary losses — as predicted by regret aversion — a subordi-
nate who anticipates this disutility may reduce effort thereby reducing the probability with
which overruling occurs (see online appendix A for more details). For cases where this non-
pecuniary loss is particularly strong, effort provision in the subordinate role may be driven
to zero.
The explanation that zero effort is a response to anticipatory regret would receive support
if our individual measure of regret aversion would correlate with individual differences in
zero effort. Our interpretation is supported in precisely this way: In a probit regression,
the probability that a subordinate exerts zero effort increases by 5.9% per additional gamble
rejected (p=0.030).31
Regret in the domain of effort choices may also result in an over-provision of effort by the
controlling party if there is a non-pecuniary disutility for being unsuccessful in implementing
one’s own preferred project. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) have shown that individuals who
lose in first price sealed bid auctions to bids which are below their true valuation behave as
if they experience “loser regret”, i.e., these individuals behave as if they suffer a disutility
from losing when they could have won, and earned profit, by making a higher bid. In
our setting, the controlling party may hence regret his or her effort choice in cases where
it remains uninformed and thus could have improved the project selection by putting in
more effort. An individual in the role of the controlling party who anticipates such regret
optimally raises his or her effort (see online appendix A for more details). Again, we can
test this conjecture by using regression analysis and looking at the correlation between over-
provision of effort and our individual measure of regret aversion. In a probit regression, we
find that the probability of over-provision increases by 4.5 percent per additional gamble
31A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 in case of zero effort provision in the role of
the subordinate. Data from the four main treatments is included in this regression. The probit regression
also contains controls for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, interactions of role and treatment,
controls for beliefs, and period dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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rejected (p=0.058).32 Thus, taken together, regret aversion may be a driving force behind
all three major experimental patterns - the under-delegation of authority, the high frequency
of zero effort choices among subordinates and the over-provision of effort by the controlling
parties.33
While regret aversion shows promise in rationalizing our data, it is reasonable to ask
whether alternative hypotheses show similar promise. Could it be, for example, that the
agents’ effort choices are influenced by reciprocity or other forms of social preferences? Or,
may risk or loss aversion generate a similar pattern to regret aversion?
A common reason for deviations from standard economic predictions is the existence
of social preferences. In our setting, if agents view the delegation of authority as a kind
act they may over-provide effort because of reciprocal motivations. Likewise, if they view
a lack of delegation as an unkind act they may under-provide effort relative to their best
response. Thus, positive and negative reciprocity may, in principle, explain the agents’
effort pattern. We tested for the impact of reciprocity motives by conducting an additional
treatment in the HIGH condition in which the delegation decision was decided exogenously
by the computer. In this HIGH RAND treatment, a virtual coin is flipped each period
which determines whether control rights are kept by the principal or whether the principal
is forced to delegate them. Since the agents know that the principals are forced to make
a choice it is impossible to attribute kind or unkind intentions to the principal. If positive
or negative reciprocity play a role, the agents’ effort choices in the HIGH RAND condition
will deviate from their choices in the HIGH condition. However, neither as a controlling
party (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = .20) nor in the position of the subordinate party
(Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = .99) do the agents’ effort choices differ in the two conditions,
implying that reciprocity is unlikely to explain their effort pattern.
In all of our treatments, the controlling party over-provides effort relative to her best
response which directly increases the expected earnings of the subordinate. Thus, altruism
on the part of the controlling parties could explain this pattern of effort. To control for this
32A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 if a subject over-provided effort in the role of
the controlling party on average. Data from the four main treatments is included in this regression. The
regression also contains controls for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, and interactions of role
and treatment. Each individual in our data set who chose effort in the controlling party role at least once is
an observation.
33As was stated in result 6, we also observe a minority of subordinates who actually over-provide effort
relative to their best response. In online appendix A we show that heterogeneity in subordinate effort is
also consistent with a model with both loser regret and overrule regret. Recall that the role of controlling
party is influenced only by loser regret, and therefore individuals are predicted to exert effort above the
Nash Equilibrium in this role. As the subordinate, an individual is exposed both to the potential of being
overruled and the potential of loser regret. These forces go in opposite directions, and the response in effort
will therefore depend on an individual’s inclination towards both types of regret.
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possibility we implemented an additional control treatment with the following features. Only
one of the two subjects was given the ability to provide effort and to choose the project, but
both parties were paid based on the controlling party’s project choice. Thus, in this treatment
the passive party never receives the decision right and never makes an effort choice but only
collects her payoffs. We compare this treatment with the single player game (described at
the beginning of Section 2.3) which is identical to the above control treatment except that
no passive recipient exists. Thus in the additional control treatment social preferences can
affect the active subject’s effort while in the single player game social preferences cannot
play a role. It turns out that the effort choices of the active party and the single player are
indistinguishable (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = 0.39), indicating that social preferences do
not significantly affect effort.
Another potential reason for deviations from theoretical predictions is that the assump-
tion of expected value maximization may be violated due to loss aversion. In the online
appendix D, we show that loss aversion with a reference point at the outside option cannot
explain the over-provision of effort by the controlling parties. The intuitive reason for this
claim is as follows. For loss averse individuals, an increase in effort above the risk neutral
optimum increases the magnitude of a potential loss which reduces utility. This follows from
the fact that an increase in effort causes a sure increase in costs but as long as the possibility
of success is below 1 the controlling parties’ ex post payoff from unsuccessful search may
not cover the effort cost. Thus, for reasonable amounts of loss aversion, optimal effort is
decreasing in an individual’s degree of loss aversion. For unrealistically extreme levels of loss
aversion, an individual may prefer to guarantee a payoff rather than playing any lottery. For
controlling parties with such extreme levels of loss aversion, providing maximal effort (which
guarantees a payoff of 15) may be preferable to providing low effort and hoping for success
by the subordinate. In these cases, loss aversion would predict a maximal effort level of 100.
Looking at both cases in combination, loss aversion cannot explain effort levels which
are above the best response function but below an effort level of 100. As these are the
observations which need to be rationalized in order to explain the over-provision of effort by
the controlling parties, loss aversion cannot explain our effort results.
In online appendix E, we show that similar to loss aversion, neither risk aversion nor risk
loving preferences can account for over-provision of effort by the controlling party. Moreover,
neither risk nor loss aversion can explain the subordinates’ choice of zero effort levels because
effort costs are negligible at low effort levels. For example, assuming risk aversion, beliefs
about controlling party effort need to be extremely high to rationalize a subordinate’s effort
choice of zero. Using a CRRA utility specification of the following form, U(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , an
effort of 0 is only predicted if the belief in controlling party effort is 100 (up to σ = 8). Hence,
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only for counterfactually high beliefs (or unrealistically extreme levels of risk aversion) is zero
effort expected to occur.
4 Conclusion
Authority and power permeate political, social and economic interactions. It is therefore
important to understand their motivation and incentive effects. In this paper we tackle this
question by using a novel experimental design. We find a strong behavioral bias among
principals to retain authority against their pecuniary interests and often to the disadvantage
of both the principal and the agent. We demonstrate that under-delegation cannot be at-
tributed to principals’ beliefs nor incomplete learning, and that the individual and aggregate
income losses of this delegation bias are substantial. Our results suggest that authority has
non-pecuniary consequences that inhibit the reallocation of authority.
Our results also show that authority has effects on the motivation to provide effort that
are not captured by the theoretical model. The fundamental trade-off between incentives
and control, as modeled by Aghion and Tirole (1997), indeed exists; relative to the first
best the subordinate provides too little effort, and the controlling party provides too much.
Further, the comparative statics between treatments are well met. However, the inefficiency
generated by the incentive conflict is much greater than predicted by theory. The controlling
parties provide significantly more effort and the subordinate parties provide significantly less
relative to the Nash Equilibrium prediction. For controlling parties and a large fraction of
subordinates, this is also true relative to the best response to beliefs.
A deeper look at our data suggests that a distaste for being overruled is a substantial
determinant of the desire to retain control. Principals who are overruled after delegation
and earn the return from the agent’s preferred project are less likely to delegate in the
future relative to those who are uninformed and earn the very same return. This difference
in delegation behavior — driven by informational states and not by pecuniary payoffs —
suggests that individuals are suffering a non-pecuniary disutility from being overruled. One
potential source of such non-pecuniary disutility is regret, a theory which can also help to
explain the high frequency of zero effort among subordinates and the over-provision of effort
by the controlling parties.
Given the importance of authority and power in the functioning of economic and political
organizations we believe that the motivational biases revealed by our data should receive
more attention. In addition, further explorations into the motives behind delegation and
control are suggested by our data. Although a significant part of underdelegation can be
explained by principals’ regret aversion we also observed a nonnegligible underdelegation in
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the treatment HIGH NOREC where the principals’ recommendation could not be overruled
after delegation. This raises the question whether some subjects intrinsically prefer to be
the controlling rather than the subordinate party. In Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2012) we
show that this is indeed the case. Moreover, it is well possible that delegation of authority
is affected by the mechanism by which authority has been initially assigned. For example, if
the possession of authority is the result of prior superior performance, the principals might
even be more reluctant to delegate compared to the random assignment of authority. This
additional underdelegation may result from the perception of superior competence, from
overconfidence, or from the status gains associated with a position of authority. In addition,
research on the cultural determinants of the sources of under-delegation and the motivational
effects of decision rights may be interesting because societies seem to be quite heterogeneous
with regard to how they view and legitimize hierarchical structures.
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Appendix A: Regret Theory (Online Appendix)
This appendix examines the extent to which regret theory can rationalize our data. It is
divided into three parts. In part one, we consider the effort stage of the experiment and
concentrate on the decision problem of an agent. We consider two different sources of regret:
loser regret and overrule regret. An agent experiences loser regret if he remains uninformed
but could have achieved a higher payoff had he chosen a higher effort and been informed.
An agent experiences overrule regret if he is in the role of the subordinate, the controlling
party is informed, and the agent’s recommendation is disregarded or his effort is wasted. We
show that loser regret and overrule regret can rationalize important aspects of the agents’
behavior. In particular, loser regret induces agents in the position of the controlling party to
overexert effort relative to the best reply of those without loser regret. Overrule regret, by
contrast, induces agents in the subordinate position to reduce effort relative to agents who
have no overrule regret.
In part two, we show that these two regret forces also suffice to explain effort choices as
well as under-delegation of authority by the principals. In part three, we extend the analysis
of the principal and include a third form of regret that only principals can experience:
delegation regret. In contrast to the agents, regret experienced by principals can also stem
from their delegation decision, i.e., having delegated or not having delegated the decision
right. We show that including regret that stems from delegation can further decrease a
principal’s utility from delegating and has effects on effort similar to the regret forces studied
in the first two parts.
Part 1: Regret and Effort Decisions of the Agent: In the auction literature, it has recently
been proposed by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) that a reason for overbidding in the first
price sealed bid auction is that individuals experience “loser regret.” Loser regret occurs
when an individual bids below their valuation and is beaten by a higher bid that is below
their true valuation. In these cases, individuals experience regret because they would have
preferred to bid higher ex post than is optimal to bid ex ante. An individual who anticipates
such regret optimally increases their bid relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium in order
to reduce the potential states for which regret occurs.
In our experiment, individuals may similarly experience loser regret in cases where they
remain uninformed and thus cannot implement their preferred project. These will be cases
in which an individual’s effort is below the number drawn by the random number generator
that guides success and failure of an individual’s effort.
As the likelihood of being informed, and therefore the likelihood of regret, is based on an
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agent’s effort relative to a number drawn by nature, we require a formal way of expressing
these draws. Let xA be the realization of the random number generator (uniform between
0 and 1) for the agent, where the agent is informed if his effort is above or equal to the
realization of xA and uninformed if it is below xA. Likewise, let xP be the realization of
the number generator for the principal, with the principal being informed when his effort is
above or equal to xP and uninformed if his effort is below xP .
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In developing a formal model, we follow Loomes and Sugden (1982) and assume that
loser regret enters utility linearly. Individuals experience loser regret when they remain
uninformed and a project with a lower payoff is implemented compared to the payoff that
would have resulted from the ex-post optimal effort decision of the individual. The magnitude
of regret is related to the difference between the actual payoff and the payoff from this optimal
effort decision.
We begin by considering an agent who has received decision rights and is now the con-
trolling party. Given an implemented project k, an exerted cost of effort ed, and a draw from
the number generator xA, the agent experiences loser regret equal to
λLR max{[A2 − g(xA)]− [Ak − g(ed)], 0} (13)
any time his preferred project is not implemented, where the parameter λLR ≥ 0 is the
agent’s degree of loser regret. Note that the max function explicitly rules out rejoicing and
that the utility from the improved project choice, A2 − Ak must exceed the additional cost
of effort g(xA)− g(ed) in order for loser regret to be positive.
Let Eˆd be the agent’s belief about the principal’s effort in the role of the subordinate.
Based on these beliefs and the realizations of xP and xA, the outcome space can be partitioned
into four distinct “cells” which differ in the extent to which regret influences utility. These
cells are shown in figure (9).
In cell (i), we assume that an agent does not experience regret since he is informed and
therefore is able to implement his preferred project. In the remaining three cells, however,
the agent’s effort is below the threshold for success (ed < xA) and the agent is uninformed.
In these cases, the agent may regret his insufficient level of effort if the gain from being
informed through improved project selection exceeds the incremental cost of attaining this
information.
In cell (ii), the principal is uninformed and project 0 is recommended. If such a state is
34Individuals in the experiment were informed of their own draw from the number generator in each period.
They were uninformed about the other party’s draw. For loser regret and overrule regret considered in the
first part of the appendix, only the information state of the other party matters for regret, not their actual
draw.
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Figure 9: Agent as Controlling Party: As a controlling party, the outcome space can
be partitioned into four cells that differ with regard to the regret experienced by the agent:
In cell (i), the agent does not experience regret because he is informed and can implement
his preferred project. In cells (ii) and (iii), however, a regret averse agent will experience
loser regret since he could have achieved a higher payoff had he increased his effort. In cell
(ii), the principal is also uninformed and the agent always experiences loser regret, since it
would have been profitable to increase effort. In cells (iii) and (iv), the principal is informed
and the principal’s preferred project is implemented. In cell (iii), the return from having
the agent’s preferred project implemented, Aˆ2− Aˆ1, exceeds the additional cost of acquiring
the necessary information, given by gA(xA)− gA(ed). Therefore, the agent experiences loser
regret. In cell (iv), the additional effort cost exceeds the increased project return, and the
principal does not experience regret. The cutoff between cells (iii) and (iv) is given by
τ(ed) ≡ min{g−1A (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed)), 1}, where the min function is included to bound τ(ed)
in cases in which Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 exceeds the potential increase in effort costs.
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realized, the agent always prefers to be informed and regrets his insufficient effort level. In
cells (iii) and (iv), the principal is informed and recommends project 1. Cell (iii) contains
states in which the increased returns due to improved project choice exceed the cost of
raising effort from ed to xA, i.e., states where Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 ≥ gA(xA)− gA(ed), and therefore the
agent experiences loser regret. Cell (iv) contains states in which the additional cost of being
informed exceeds its value, and therefore the agent does not experience loser regret. The
threshold between cells (iii) and (iv) is given by τ(ed), where τ(ed) ≡ min{g−1A (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 +
gA(e
d)), 1}.35
Considering all four cells for the computation of utility, an agent in the role of the
controlling party has utility udA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆd) =
=

A2 − gA(ed) if xA ≤ ed,
A0 − gA(ed)− λLR[Aˆ2 − gA(xA) + gA(ed)] if xA > ed & xP > Eˆd,
A1 − gA(ed)− λLR[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − gA(xA) + gA(ed)] if τ(ed) ≥ xA > ed & xP ≤ Eˆd,
A1 − gA(ed) if xA > τ(ed) > ed & xP ≤ Eˆd.
(14)
Intuitively, individuals who are in the role of the controlling party experience loser regret
only in cases where they exert less effort than the amount needed to be informed. Thus,
individuals who anticipate loser regret are likely to increase their effort relative to that of the
best response of a standard expected value maximizer. The following proposition formalizes
this intuition:
Proposition 1 In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, an agent who anticipates
loser regret and who has received control from a delegating principal will over exert effort
relative to the best response of an individual who maximizes expected value.
Proof. An agent who has anticipatory regret maximizes the expected value of udA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆd)
over all realizations of xA and xP . Taking into consideration the cases in which regret will
occur, this is equivalent to maximizing:
max
ed
edAˆ2 + (1− ed)EˆdAˆ1 − gA(ed)
−λLR(1− Eˆd)(1− ed)[Aˆ2 − ExA(gA(xA)|xA > ed) + gA(ed)]
−λLREˆd(τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − ExA(gA(xA)|xA ∈ (ed, τ(ed))) + gA(ed)]
35Since xA is bounded above at 1, τ(e
d) is also bounded above at 1. If τ(ed) = 1 the agent always
experiences loser regret. Note that Aˆ2 − gA(1) + gA(0) > 0 for the parameters chosen so that the agent
always regrets not implementing his best project when the outside option is implemented.
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As the derivative of τ(ed) is discontinuous at 1, the first order condition is solved sepa-
rately for τ(ed) < 1 and τ(ed) = 1. In the case of τ(ed) < 1, two intermediate results are
useful for constructing the first order condition. First note that:
− d
ded
(1− ed)ExA(gA(xA)|xA > ed) = −
∫ 1
ed
gA(z)dz = gA(e
d) (15)
by Leipniz’s rule. Further,
− d
ded
(τ(ed)− ed)ExA(gA(xA)|xA ∈ (ed, τ(ed)) = −τ
′
(ed)[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed)] + gA(ed) (16)
by Leipniz’s rule and the fact that gA(τ(e
d)) = Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed). Using these intermediate
calculations, the first order condition of this equation can be expressed as the following
implicit function:
Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1 − g′A(ed) + λLR(1− Eˆd)[Aˆ2 − (1− ed)g
′
A(e
d)]+ (17)
+λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)g′A(ed)] = 0.
Effort is strictly above the best response of a standard expected value maximizer without
regret if for a positive λLR the last two terms are positive when evaluated at or below the
standard best response. Note that at the standard best response correspondence, g
′
A(e
d) =
Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1, we can substitute in for g′A(ed) to test this restriction. Looking at the last two
terms with g
′
A(e
d) replaced with Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1 yields
λLR(1− Eˆd)[edAˆ2 + (1− ed)EˆdAˆ1] (18)
for the second to last term and
λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]] (19)
for the last term. Subtracting Eˆd(1−Eˆd)Aˆ1 from expression (18) and adding it to expression
(19), these two sub-equations can be further rewritten as
λLR(1− Eˆd)ed[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1] (20)
and
λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + (1− Eˆd)Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]]. (21)
Expression (20) is clearly positive since ed and Ed take intermediate values between zero and
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one along the best response function and Aˆ2 > Aˆ1. Expression (21) is decreasing in τ(e
d)
and thus is (weakly) larger than
λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + (1− Eˆd)Aˆ1 − (1− ed)[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]] = λLREˆded[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1], (22)
which is also strictly positive. Thus, expression (21) is positive. As both terms are positive,
it follows that an individual who experiences loser regret will exert more effort than an
individual who maximizes expected value for any given belief about the other parties effort.
Proposition 1 shows that controlling agents who experience loser regret tend to overpro-
vide effort relative to an expected value maximizer which rationalizes an important aspect
of our data.36
Turning to the subordinate role, the agent’s optimization problem and the potential
sources of regret change considerably. In particular, as a subordinate the agent can experi-
ence regret whenever the controlling party is informed since subordinate effort is wasted in
these cases and it would have been optimal ex post to free ride on the informed principal.
We refer to this form of regret as overrule regret. Regretting wasted effort is likely to be par-
ticularly salient when the agent is successful and the information generated from his effort is
wasted. To account for the particular salience of this event, we assume that the agents who
are overruled not only experience regret due to their wasted effort, but also in proportion to
the foregone payoffs lost due to their information being ignored.37
In figure (10) we again partition the state space into cells that differ with regard to the
regret experienced by the agent. We continue to assume that no regret is experienced if the
36Note that in principle, individuals may also experience “winner regret” in which an individual regrets over
exertion relative to the level of effort needed to be informed. This force could be added to our model and would
not change the main propositions as long as anticipated loser regret is not outweighed by anticipated winner
regret. Note that if winner regret would be stronger than loser regret one cannot explain the overprovision of
effort by the controlling parties. This suggests that winner regret is weaker than loser regret in our setting.
This is precisely the result reported in Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), who find strong evidence of loser regret
but conclude that “winner regret” is either a weaker force or unanticipated by subjects. Therefore, to keep
our model simple and parsimonious, we have excluded winner regret from the analysis.
37Formally, the agent experiences overrule regret equal to λORgA(e) if the principal is informed and the
agent is uninformed, and overrule regret equal to λOR[Aˆ2− Aˆ1 + gA(e)] if both parties are informed and the
agent is overruled. We also considered specifications in which (i) wasted effort and the disutility of being
overruled had different coefficients and (ii) where one of the two forces was excluded. As both forces move in
the same direction, both forms of regret lead to a reduction in effort relative to the standard best response,
and therefore there is no qualitative differences across these models. However, regret proportional to the
foregone payoff (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1) due to the overruled recommendation is necessary to predict zero effort choices
by subordinates. If wasted effort is the only source of overrule regret, the marginal increase in anticipatory
regret at an effort level of zero is zero, implying that positive effort is always predicted. This is not the case
when the foregone payoff (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1) matters for overrule regret.
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agent receives the payoff from his own preferred project. This is the case in cell (i), since the
agent is informed and the controlling party is not. In cell (ii), the agent experiences loser
regret since both parties remain uninformed and project 0 is implemented. In such states,
the agent regrets his insufficient effort level since he could have improved project selection
had he chosen e = xA.
Cells (iii) and (iv) are cases in which the controlling party is informed. As the agent in
the subordinate role is not in control of final project selection, subordinate effort in these
cases is effectively wasted, and the agent experiences overrule regret. In cell (iii), the agent
remained uninformed and therefore regrets having wasted his effort. In cell (iv), the agent
was informed himself and experiences overrule regret not only from wasted effort, but also
from having his recommendation ignored by the principal.
Agent as subordinate party
Ax
(iii)
Overrule Regret
f d ff
(ii)
Loser Regret
(R i A )rom waste  e ort
(Receive A1)
ece ve  0
(iv)
Overrule Regret
f t d ff t d l d P j t
(i)
No Regret
e
rom was e  e or  an  overru e   ro ec
(Receive A1)
(Receive A2)
E Px
Figure 10: Agent as Subordinate: For agents as subordinates, the state space can be
partitioned into four cells, which differ in the extent to which the agent experiences regret: In
cell (i), the agent experiences no regret because his preferred project is implemented. In cell
(ii), the agent experiences loser regret. Here both parties remain uninformed, implying that
the agent could have improved the outcome by raising his own effort to e = xA. The agent
experiences overrule regret from wasted effort whenever the controlling party is informed,
which is the case in cells (iii) and (iv). In cell (iv), overrule regret is particularly strong
because the agent is also informed, but the agent’s recommendation is ignored.
As with loser regret, we model “overrule regret” in a linear fashion. Let e be the effort of
the agent in the role of the subordinate and let Eˆ be the agent’s belief about the principal’s
effort in the role of the controlling party. The utility of an agent in the role of the subordinate
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is then given by:
uA(e|xA, xP , Eˆ) =

A2 − gA(e) if xA ≤ e & xP > Eˆ
A0 − gA(e)− λLR[Aˆ2 − gA(xA) + gA(e)] if xA > e & xP > Eˆ
A1 − gA(e)− λORgA(e) if xA > e & xP ≤ Eˆ
A1 − gA(e)− λOR[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(e)] if xA ≤ e & xP ≤ Eˆ
(23)
where λOR ≥ 0 is the agent’s degree of overrule regret.
Just as loser regret can increase effort relative to the best response, individuals who
anticipate overrule regret will decrease effort in order to reduce the possibility of being
overruled. Depending on whether an individual is more sensitive to loser regret or overrule
regret, effort in the subordinate role can be either higher or lower than the standard best
response. Effort may also be zero if individuals experience a significant amount of overrule
regret and the degree of loser regret isn’t too strong.
Proposition 2 In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, an agent who is in the
role of the subordinate may experience either loser regret or overrule regret depending on
the realized state. Individuals who anticipate a disutility of being overruled will decrease
effort relative to those who do not. Individuals who anticipate loser regret will increase effort
relative to those who do not. As these forces move in different directions, heterogeneity in
anticipatory regret may lead to observed effort choices both above and below the best response.
Proof. As before, an agent who has anticipatory regret maximizes the expected value
of uA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆ) over all realizations of xA and xP . After some simplifications, the agent
maximizes:
max
e
Eˆ[Aˆ1 − eλOR(Aˆ2 − Aˆ1)]− gA(e) + [1− Eˆ]Aˆ2[e− λLR(1− e)] + (24)
+[1− Eˆ](1− e)λLRExA(gA(xA)|xA > e)− [1− Eˆ](1− e)λLRgA(e)− EˆλORgA(e)
Taking the first order condition yields the following implicit function:
(1 + λLR)[1− Eˆ]Aˆ2 − EˆλOR(Aˆ2 − Aˆ1) = g′A(e)[1 + (1− Eˆ)(1− e)λLR + EˆλOR] (25)
As [1 − Eˆ][1 − e] < 1 − Eˆ, effort is again higher when λLR is positive. However, since the
left hand side is decreasing in λOR while the right hand side is increasing, overrule regret
leads to a decrease in effort relative to an expected value maximizer. As overrule regret and
loser regret go in opposite directions, effort choices as a subordinate should be heterogeneous
depending on the magnitude of these forces in individuals’ utility functions.
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Part 2: Overrule Regret and the Delegation Decision of the Principal: Having considered
how regret affects the effort decision of an agent in the controlling party and the subordinate
role, we next turn to the effort and delegation decisions of the principal. Just as with
the agent, a principal can experience loser regret in cases where her best project is not
implemented and overrule regret in cases where she is in the subordinate role and the agent
is informed. Analogous to the agent, these forces increase the principal’s effort as a controlling
party and can lead her to under or over-exert effort after delegation, i.e. when she is the
subordinate.
Propositions (1) and (2) and analogous results for the principal thus show that loser
regret and overrule regret can rationalize the effort patterns observed in our experimental
data. Controlling parties with loser regret will over provide effort relative to the risk neutral
best reply of an individual without loser regret. Rational subordinates who anticipate the
increased effort of the controlling party will update their beliefs upward (as observed in
the data) and have an incentive to reduce their effort relative to the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium. In addition, regret averse subordinates with strong enough overrule regret will
have an incentive to further decrease their effort below the risk neutral best reply because this
reduces overrule regret. If anticipated, this decrease in subordinate effort will further increase
effort of the controlling party. Taken together, equilibrium effort provision is expected to be
larger for controlling parties and smaller for subordinates if regret aversion exists compared
to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium without regret.
It turns out that these same forces can also result in under delegation by the principal. As
overrule regret has a negative utility that arises only in the case of delegation, overrule regret
decreases the utility of delegation relative to the utility of keeping control. Thus overrule
regret can lead to under delegation relative to a standard expected utility maximizer.38
Proposition 3 Overrule regret decreases the utility of delegation and has no effect on the
utility of keeping control. Thus individuals who experience overrule regret may keep control
rights even in cases in which expected value comparisons predict delegation.
Proof. This proposition follows from a direct comparison of the utility for a principal
holding control and delegating.
Part 3: Regret Due to the Delegation Choice: While we can capture all the main devi-
ations observed in our data with loser regret and overrule regret, a formulation using only
38The effects of loser regret on delegation are more subtle and may go in either direction depending on
the efforts chosen by the principal and agent.
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these two forces ignores the fact that the principal’s decision problem and the agent’s de-
cision problem differ in the delegation stage. In order to understand how regret over the
delegation decision might affect the principal’s decisions, this section extends the model to
include regret that might occur due to the principal’s delegation choice.
In modeling regret over the delegation choice, we take a direct extension of the baseline
model where a principal compares the outcome of his selected delegation and effort decision
pair with the decision pair which would maximize his payoff ex post given information about
the state of nature and beliefs about agent behavior. To ensure consistency, we hold the
beliefs about the effort of the agent in the subgame which was not entered constant.39 We
also rule out the analogue of winner regret by assuming that the minimum effort that an
individual believes she will exert in the counterfactual where she kept control rights is equal
to the amount of effort actually exerted after delegation (i.e., we restrict the counterfactual
E to be greater or equal to Ed).
We begin by studying the effort decision of a principal who keeps control. In cases where
the principal’s preferred project is not implemented, a principal has two possible ways in
which she might alter her actions to improve her final payoff. First, if she continues to
maintain control, the principal can increase effort to E = xP , thus ensuring her preferred
project is implemented. Second, if in case of delegation the agent is informed, the principal
could instead delegate control to the agent. In this alternative case, the principal’s optimal
subordinate effort is zero since the informed agent will anyway implement his preferred
project, regardless of the principal’s recommendation. As a naming convention, we define
delegation regret as regret which occurs in states where the principal would prefer to change
her delegation decision.
In figure (11) we again partition the state space into cells that differ with regard to
the regret experienced by the principal. In cell (i), we continue to assume that no regret is
experienced if the principal is informed and can choose her preferred project. If the principal
remains uninformed, however, she experiences either loser regret or delegation regret. In cell
(ii), the agent remains uninformed even if the principal delegates decision rights. In this
case, the principal can improve her payoff by increasing her own effort, and therefore she
experiences loser regret. In cells (iii) and (v), the principal remains uninformed and the agent
is informed, such that project 2 is chosen. In these cases, the principal could have improved
her payoff by either keeping the decision right and increasing her own effort to xP , or by
delegating the decision right to the informed agent and choosing zero effort herself. This
will depend on the profitability of these alternative strategies, i.e., on whether P1 − gP (xP )
39For example, if the principal keeps control, she does not update her beliefs about the effort the agent
would have put in she had delegated regardless of the effort observed from the agent in the subordinate role.
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Figure 11: Principal as Controlling Party: For principals in the role of the controlling
party, the state space can be partitioned into six cells, which differ with regard to the
regret experienced by the principal. In cell (i), the principal experiences no regret because
her preferred project is implemented. In cell (ii), both the principal and the agent remain
uninformed in both subgames. In the remaining cells, the principal is uninformed but the
agent is either informed, as in cells (iii) and (v), or would have been informed if delegation
had taken place, as in cells (iv) and (vi). In these cells, the principal either regrets his
effort choice and experiences loser regret or regrets his delegation choice and experiences
delegation regret. This depends on whether it is ex-post optimal to keep the decision right
and increase effort to E = xP , as in cells (iii) and (iv), or whether it is ex-post optimal to
delegate the decision right to the agent and choose Ed = 0, as in cells (v) and (vi). The
cutoff between cells with loser regret and delegation regret if the agent would be informed
after delegation depend on whether P1 − gP (xP ) is greater or less than P2 − gP (0) and is
defined by xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2).
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is greater or less than P2 − gP (0). The threshold between these strategies is defined by xP ,
where xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2). In cell (iii), P1 − gP (xP ) ≥ P2 − gP (0), such that the principal
prefers to keep the decision right and to increase effort. Therefore, she experiences loser
regret. In cell (v), P1 − gP (xP ) < P2 − gP (0), such that the principal prefers to delegate the
decision right and to choose zero effort. Therefore, she experiences delegation regret.
Cells (iv) and (vi) differ from cells (iii) and (v) in that the agent is uninformed as a
subordinate and therefore project 0 is implemented. However, if the principal delegates the
decision right the agent is informed, and therefore project 2 is implemented. Whether the
principal prefers to increase her own effort or to delegate the decision right to the agent and
to choose zero effort herself will therefore again depend on which of these two strategies is
more profitable, i.e., whether P1 − gP (xP ) is greater or less than P2 − gP (0). In cell (iv),
the principal prefers to raise her effort and hence she experiences loser regret. In cell (vi),
the principal prefers to delegate the decision right and to choose zero effort, and hence she
experiences delegation regret.40
Combining all cells, the utility of a principal in the role of the controlling party is given
by uP (E|xA, xP , eˆ, Ed) =
P1 − gP (E) if xP ≤ E
P0 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP > E & xA > eˆd
P0 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP ≥ xP > E & eˆ < xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − Pˆ2 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP ≥ xP > E & xA ≤ eˆ
P0 − gP (E)− λD[Pˆ2 + gP (E)] if xP > xP & xP > E & eˆ < xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (E)− λD[gP (E)] if xP > xP & xP > E & xA ≤ eˆ
(26)
where λD is the principal’s degree of delegation regret.
As can be seen by comparing equations (14) and (26) as well as figures (9) and (11), the
principal’s utility is similar to that of the agent except that for those realizations of xP and
xA for which the principal would have preferred to delegate rather than to have increased
effort, loser regret is substituted by delegation regret. Note that both forms of regret can be
reduced by increasing E and therefore affect the controlling party’s effort decision in similar
ways. The following remark summarizes the effects of delegation regret on effort:41
40Note that g−1p (P1−P2) ≤ g−1P (P1−P2 +gP (E)), i. e., xP ≤ τ(E). Hence, unlike the agent, the principal
will always experience either delegation regret or loser regret in case she remains uninformed. If xP > 1, the
principal never experiences delegation regret and always regrets not having invested more effort.
41The proof for this remark follows directly from the first order condition of the principal’s decision problem
and is omitted.
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Remark 1 In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, a principal who anticipates
delegation regret and has held decision rights will over exert effort relative to the best response
of an individual who maximizes expected value.
Remark (1) shows that delegation regret has a positive effect on the principal’s effort as
a controlling party. As with loser regret, the principal attempts to avoid states where he is
uninformed in order to reduce the likelihood of regretting his delegation decision.
Finally, we can turn attention to the case of a principal who delegated control. In this
subgame, a principal can potentially experience all three forms of regret: loser regret, overrule
regret and delegation regret. In figure (12) we again partition the state space into cells that
differ with regard to the regret experienced by the principal.
Principal as subordinate party
(iv)
Overrule Regret
Px
From wasted effort
(Receive P2)
(ii)
Px
(iii)
Loser Regret
(Receive P0)
Delegation Regret
(Receive P2)
(i)
dE
No Regret
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Figure 12: Principal as Subordinate: For principals in the role of the subordinate party,
the state space can be partitioned into four cells, which differ with regard to the regret
experienced by the principal. In cell (i), a principal experiences no regret because only she
is informed and therefore her preferred project is implemented. In cell (ii), both parties
remain uninformed and therefore the principal experiences loser regret from not having
chosen Ed = xP . In cells (iii) and (iv), the agent is informed and implements his preferred
project. In these cells, the principal either regrets delegating or regrets his effort choice.
Which regret force is felt depends on whether it is ex-post optimal to have kept the decision
right and exerted E = max{Ed, xP}, as in cell (iii), or to have delegated the decision right
and exerted Ed = 0, as in cell (iv). The cutoff between cells with delegation regret and
overrule regret depend on whether P1 − gP (xP ) is greater or less than P2 − gP (0) and is
defined by xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2).
In cell (i), the principal can implement her preferred project and therefore she does not
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experience regret. In cell (ii), both the principal and the agent are uninformed. As the
principal could have been informed by increasing effort, she experiences loser regret. In cells
(iii) and (iv) the agent is informed and thus the agent implements his preferred project. As
the principal receives the agent’s preferred project, she experiences either delegation regret
or overrule regret depending on her ex-post optimal strategy. If xP ≤ xP = g−1p (P1−P2), the
principal’s ex-post optimal action is to keep the decision right and choose E = max{Ed, xP},
where the “max” comes from the assumption that the principal never expects to exert less
effort with held control rights than after delegation. If xP > xP , however, the principal’s
ex-post optimal action is to continue to delegate and choose zero effort. Therefore, in cell
(iii), the principal experiences delegation regret and in cell (iv) the principal experiences
overrule regret.
Combing the cells into a single utility function, the utility of a principal in the role of
the subordinate is given by UdP (E
d|xA, xP , eˆd, E) =
=

P1 − gP (Ed) if xP ≤ Ed & xA > eˆd
P0 − gP (Ed)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (Ed)] if xP > Ed & xA > eˆd
P2 − gP (Ed)− λD[Pˆ1 − Pˆ2 − gP (max{Ed, xP}) + gP (Ed)] if xP ≤ xP & xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (Ed)− λORgP (Ed) if xP > xP & xA ≤ eˆd
,
(27)
Comparing equations (27) and (23) as well as figures (10) and (12), it can again be
seen that overrule regret is substituted by delegation regret whenever delegation regret is of
larger magnitude than overrule regret. This implies that the effort choice of the principal as
a subordinate is increasing or decreasing relative to the standard best response, depending
on the strength of loser regret and the combined strength of overrule and delegation regret.
Remark 2 Principals in the subordinate role either experience delegation regret or overrule
regret when the controlling party is informed. Anticipation of both forms of regret will de-
crease effort relative to those who do not. Individuals who anticipate loser regret will increase
effort relative to those who do not. As these forces move in different directions, heterogene-
ity in anticipatory regret may lead to observed effort choices both above and below the best
response.
We now turn attention to the effects of delegation regret on the delegation decision.
Delegation regret further reduces the utility of delegation since the principal will ex-post
experience delegation regret in a multitude of states. Delegation regret may also reduce
the utility in case of kept control, since the principal may also regret not having delegated
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ex-post. However, as we explain below, it seems plausible that in our experiment regret after
delegation played a more important role.
A principal who delegates observes xP ex-post and thus knows with certainty whether she
would have had a better outcome had she kept decision rights. She also directly experiences
her recommendation being overruled, which may be particularly salient. By contrast, the
principal is never informed of xA. If a principal keeps control and experiences the agent rec-
ommending the outside option (which indicates that the agent is not informed) she does not
know whether the agent would have been informed if she had delegated. It therefore seems
reasonable to assume that the experience of delegation regret after the principal kept control
is much less salient than the delegation regret experienced after the principal delegated and
was informed. If this was the case, delegation regret is likely to have reduced the incentive
to delegate.42
42One way to account for these saliency differences in the model might be to allow for different degrees
of delegation regret λD in the delegation and in the no-delegation subgames. To avoid further notation,
however, we abstracted from this differentiation in this appendix.
55
Appendix B: Session Overview (Online Appendix)
Table B.1: Session Overview
Date Treatment Subjects Matching Groups Periods
Main Treatments
May 2008 PLOW 30 3 10
May 2008 PLOW 30 3 10
May 20071 LOW 12 1 10
May 2007 LOW 30 3 10
May 2008 LOW 30 3 10
May 20071 HIGH 10 1 10
May 2007 HIGH 30 3 10
June 2007 HIGH 28 3 10
Oct 20082 HIGH 30 3 10
June 2007 PHIGH 30 3 10
May 2008 PHIGH 30 3 10
Control Treatments
Oct 2008 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
May 2009 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
May 2009 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
April 2011 PHIGH50 32 2 50
April 2011 PHIGH50 32 2 50
April 2011 HIGH NOREC 28 2 25
April 2011 PHIGH25 32 2 25
1 This session was split into two matching groups with different treatments.
2 This session did not use the strategy method for eliciting agent effort.
56
Appendix C: Additional Tables (Online Appendix)
Table C.1: Average effort levels vs. Nash predictions across treatments
Controlling Party Subordinate
Principal Agent Agent Principal
E ENE ed ed
NE
e eNE Ed Ed
NE
PLOW 55.7 55 68.1 *** 45 22.8 25 16.5 *** 35
LOW 66.1 *** 55 68.3 *** 55 14.3 *** 25 16.2 ** 25
HIGH 48.2 * 45 58.7 *** 45 26.5 *** 35 19.6 *** 35
PHIGH 58.2 *** 45 65.1 ** 55 17.3 *** 35 20.7 25
Significance Levels for Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests against Nash predictions with data averaged by individ-
ual prior to estimation. Significance Levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Table C.2: Overall profit of principals and agents by treatment
Principals Agents
Actuala Predictedb Actuala Predictedb
PLOW 18.23 20.1 22.35 25.6
LOW 18.40 20.1 16.32 17.3
HIGH 21.13 24.0 20.69 23.3
PHIGH 21.89 25.6 16.83 20.1
aActual earnings in treatment.
bPredicted earnings with Nash equilibrium effort and delegation.
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Table C.3: Delegation decisions by principals
(1) (2) (3a) (4b)
PLOW 0.035 0.061 0.106
(0.068) (0.073) (0.080)
HIGH 0.245*** 0.310*** 0.462***
(0.061) (0.097) (0.153)
PHIGH 0.326*** 0.356*** 0.503*** 0.003
(0.085) (0.118) (0.160) (0.144)
Belief if subordinate –0.003** –0.002 –0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Belief if controlling party 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
# of Lotteries Declined –0.062** –0.120**
(0.026) (0.052)
Period Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo. R2 .062 .112 .179 .176
Observations 1450 1450 750 300
Marginal effects of a probit regression. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard
error in parentheses, clustered by individual. a Regret aversion measures are available only for sessions
conducted in 2008-2011. b Column (4) includes data only from the HIGH and PHIGH treatments for which
we have regret aversion measures, and HIGH is the omitted category.
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Table C.4: Average effort levels vs. average beliefs across treatments
Controlling Party Effort Subordinate Effort
Principal Agent Agent Principal
has control has control has control has control
E Eˆ ed eˆd e eˆ Ed Eˆd
PLOW 55.7 ** 64.8 68.1 ** 59.6 22.8 30.4 16.5 21.8
LOW 66.1 66.9 68.3 68.4 14.3 *** 27.5 16.2 * 20.9
HIGH 48.2 *** 59.0 58.7 56.2 26.5 ** 35.8 19.6 * 29.4
PHIGH 58.2 ** 69.3 65.1 62.3 17.3 ** 28.2 20.7 19.0
Significance levels calculated using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual
prior to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. E is the principals’ average
effort with control. Eˆ is the agents’ average belief about principals’ effort with control. ed is the agents’
average effort with control. eˆd is the principals’ average belief about agents’ effort with control. e is the
agents’ average effort in the subordinate role. eˆ is the principals’ average belief about agents’ effort in the
subordinate role. Ed is the principals’ average effort in the subordinate role. Eˆd is the agents’ average belief
about principals’ effort in the subordinate role.
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Appendix D: Loss Aversion and Effort (Online Appendix)
In discussing the effort provision of a loss averse individual, we made the intuitive argument
that loss aversion cannot explain the observed effort choices of the controlling party. This
appendix shows that a controlling party who is loss averse will never choose effort which is
above 60 but below 100. To simplify the equations, we follow the theory section and express
all effort choices in decimal form (i.e., an effort of 60 is expressed as .6).
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that subjects have a utility function of
the following form:
v(x) =
x−R if x ≥ R(1 + λ)(x−R) if x < R , (28)
where λ ≥ 0 denotes the degree of loss aversion and R denotes the reference point. A natural
reference point is R = 10, the value of project P0 in each experiment. Recall that if subjects
provide zero effort, they can always ensure a payoff of P0 = 10 by choosing the known outside
option. Also recall that eˆ is the belief of the principal about the effort of the agent when she
is the controlling party. We begin by proving the following:
Lemma 1 Let E∗(λ, eˆ) be a local maximum of the principal’s utility maximization prob-
lem when she is the controlling party with loss aversion λ and beliefs eˆ. Then E∗(λ, eˆ) is
decreasing in loss aversion if E∗(0, eˆ) < .65.
Proof. If E < 0.65, the cost of effort is below 10. Given the parameters in the authority
game, this implies that losses relative to the reference point can only occur in the case that
both the controlling party and the subordinate remain uninformed. We use this fact to
circumvent non-differentiability around the reference point by restricting analysis to this
region. The optimization problem of the principal when she is the controlling party is
max
E
U(E) = E(P1 −R− gP (E)) + (1− E)eˆ(P2 −R− gP (E)) (29)
−(1 + λ)(1− E)(1− eˆ)(P0 −R− gP (E)).
By assumption R = P0, which implies that the corresponding first order condition is:
U ′(E) = (Pˆ1 − gP (E))− Eg′P (E)− eˆ(Pˆ2 − gP (E))− g
′
P (E)eˆ(1− E)− (30)
(1 + λ)(1− eˆ)[(gP (E))− g′P (E)(1− E)] = 0.
Rearranging this equation and replacing g
′
P (E) and gP (E) and Pˆ1 with their values which
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were constant across treatments yields:
U ′(E) = −50E + 30− eˆPˆ2 + 50λ(1− eˆ)E
[
3
2
E − 1
]
= 0. (31)
Writing 31 as an implicit function, the FOC is satisfied when:
E =
30− eˆPˆ2
50
+ λ(1− eˆ)E
[
3
2
E − 1
]
. (32)
The last term is negative for E ∈ [0, 2
3
]
and λ > 0. Thus, effort is decreasing in λ for all
E∗(0, eˆ) < .65 (our initial condition for the considered case).
We now prove our main result:
Proposition 4 Effort of a loss averse individual will never be above 60 but below 100.
Proof. Equation 31 can be rewritten as follows:
U ′(E) = 75λ(1− eˆ)E2 − 50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]E + 30− eˆPˆ2 = 0. (33)
Note that this equation is quadratic and thus has two roots. Taking the second derivative
of U with respect to E we have:
U ′′(E) = 150λ(1− eˆ)E − 50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]. (34)
Thus, there is a unique inflection point at E = 1
3
1+λ(1−eˆ)
λ(1−eˆ) . The second derivative is negative
to the left of this reflection point and positive to the right of this inflection point.
Solving the quadratic equation, E is a local maxima/minima at:
50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]±√Z(λ)
150λ(1− eˆ) , (35)
where Z(λ) = 2500[1 + λ(1 − eˆ)]2 − 300λ(1 − eˆ)[30 − eˆPˆ2]. Also note that Z(λ) is always
greater than 0 so both roots exist. Comparing this to the inflection point, the left root is
the local maximum. Next, using L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
E∗(0, eˆ) = lim
λ→0
50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]−√Z(λ)
150λ(1− eˆ) =
[30− eˆPˆ2]
50
≤ .6 (36)
By lemma 1, it follows that this unique local maximum is decreasing in loss aversion. As
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the unique local maximum is always below 60 and E ∈ [0, 100], it follows that the global
maxima are either below 60 or at the boundaries of E = 0 and E = 100.
Appendix E: Risk Aversion and Effort (Online Appendix)
In discussing the effort provision of a risk averse individual, we made an informal argument
as to why risk aversion and risk lovingness cannot account for the effort provisions of the
controlling party. This appendix provides numeric support for this argument for the case of
CRRA utility. To simplify the equations, we follow the theory section and express all effort
choices in decimal form (i.e., an effort of 60 is expressed as .6).
Recall that a controlling principal with belief eˆ about the effort of the subordinate and
a concave utility function has an expected utility of
U(E) = Eu(P1 + w − gP (E)) + eˆ(1− E)u(P2 + w − gP (E)) (37)
+(1− eˆ)(1− E)u(P0 + w − gP (E))
where w is wealth, P1 = 40, P2 ∈ {35, 20}, P0 = 10, gP (E) = 25E2, and eˆ ∈ {0, .05, . . . , 1}.
As can be seen by studying the arguments on the right hand side of this equation, increasing
effort has two effects. First, an increase in effort increases the probability of winning the
highest valued gamble which strictly increases utility. Second, increasing effort decreases
the utility earned for each of the three possible outcomes. As this second effect necessarily
depends on the marginal utility of three separate points, it is easy to construct cases in which
locally, effort is increasing in risk aversion. Such local non-monotonicity makes analytic
analysis both tedious and unenlightening, particularly for extremely concave utility or those
which do not satisfy decreasing relative risk aversion.
As the decision problem of the controlling party is inherently discrete, we take a more
direct approach to determining the potential effect of risk aversion on effort. Starting with
common parameterized risk aversion utility functions such as CRRA and CARA, we find
the risk aversion parameters which maximize effort and then compare these effort levels to
the risk neutral baseline.
As with loss aversion, there is potential that an extremely risk averse controlling party
will choose an effort of 100 and ensure themselves P1. As a first step of the analysis, we start
by finding the lowest σ for which an individual with a CRRA utility will choose an effort of
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1. Let
E(σ, eˆ) = argmax
E
Eu(P1+w−gP (E))+eˆ(1−E)u(P2+w−gP (E))+(1−eˆ)(1−E)u(P0+w−gP (E))
(38)
be the optimal effort of an individual with CRRA utility of the form u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ where
w ≥ 16 so that utility is always well defined. Next, define σ1 to be the smallest risk aversion
parameter such that E(σ1, eˆ) = 1. It can be shown analytically that E(σ, eˆ) = 1 for all
σ > σ1 and thus that σ1 is a sufficient statistic for the parameter space where full effort is
predicted.
Our interest in risk aversion lies in being able to predict effort levels above the risk neutral
prediction but below an effort of 1. The next step of our analysis is to look at the maximum
possible effort which can be predicted for all σ ∈ [−∞, σ1). Let
σ∗(eˆ) = arg max
σ∈[−∞,σ1)
E(σ, eˆ) (39)
and define E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) as the effort level which corresponds to σ∗(eˆ). For all initial beliefs,
we find E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and compare this to E(0, eˆ), the effort predicted when an individual is
risk neutral.
Table E.1: Maximum effort predicted by risk aversion
Low Treatment High Treatment
eˆ σ∗(eˆ) σ1 E(σ∗, eˆ) E(0, eˆ)
0 −0.7− 0.6 1.2 60 60
10 −0.3− 0.3 1.4 60 60
20 −1.3− 0.7 1.6 55 55
30 −0.9− 0.5 2.0 55 55
40 −2− 0.9 2.5 50 50
50 −1.8− 0.6 3.2 50 50
eˆ σ∗(eˆ) σ1 E(σ∗, eˆ) E(0, eˆ)
0 −0.7− 0.6 1.2 60 60
10 −.9− 0.7 1.6 55 55
20 −1.1− 0.7 2.2 50 50
30 −1.2− 0.8 2.9 45 45
40 −1.4− 0.9 3.8 40 40
50 −1.5− 1.3 5.0 35 35
Table E.1 reports σ∗(eˆ), σ1, as well as E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and E(0, eˆ) for initial beliefs eˆ in
intervals of 10. As can be seen, σ∗(eˆ) < 0 for all initial beliefs revealing that an individual
who is slightly risk loving will provide the highest effort. As can be seen in the last two
columns of the table, however, the increase in effort for these individuals is not large enough
to alter the effort predictions.
As we typically are most interested in small amounts of risk aversion, it is useful to also
look at σ in the domain of [0, σ1). For all wealth and beliefs, it is the case that effort is
maximal in this domain when σ = 0.
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Just as with loss aversion, effort provision under risk aversion has a difficult time explain-
ing effort levels above the risk neutral prediction. For all w ≥ 16, all beliefs eˆ, and using
both CRRA and CARA utility, it is never the case that E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) − E(0, eˆ) > 5. As 50
percent of our data lies 15 points above the risk neutral prediction, we cannot rationalize
the over-provision of effort by the controlling party with risk preferences.
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